Synthesized answer
According to the passages, Aquinas separates Question 9 ("That Which Moves the Will") and Question 10 ("The Manner in Which the Will is Moved") as part of a structured inquiry into the acts of the will with regard to the end. Specifically, he states that concerning the first act (volition), "three things must be considered: (1) Of what things is the will? [Q. 8]; (2) By what is the will moved? [Q. 9]; (3) How is it moved? [Q. 10]" [3]. This shows that the distinction is a conceptual division: Q. 9 examines the *causes* or movers of the will (e.g., intellect, sensitive appetite, God), while Q. 10 examines the *process* or manner of that movement (e.g., whether it is moved naturally, or of necessity by its object or by God) [1][2].
The nuanced understanding of human agency conveyed by this division is that the will is not a simple, undirected faculty. It is moved by various principles (intellect, external objects, God) but also moves itself through reason, as seen in the reply that "man determines himself by his reason to will this or that" [1]. By separating the "what" from the "how," Aquinas emphasizes that the will's movement involves both external influences and internal…
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
n's knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a creature from without, as stated above (A. 4). Reply Obj. 3: God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (Q. 109, A. 2). ^Q. 9 QUESTION 10: OF THE…
ence to the conclusion. And in like manner the will sometimes wills the end, and yet does not proceed to will the means. The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what has been said above (A. 2, ad 2). For the useful and the righteous are not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else: wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the other; but not conversely. ^Q. 8 QUESTION 9: OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL edit ^TOC ^a. The Nature of Voluntary Acts in General ^C. Acts…
to the means to the end; we must therefore consider: (1) [C.] those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the end [QQ. 8-12]; and (2) [D.] those whereby it is moved to the means [QQ. 13-16] . And since it seems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end; viz. "volition," "enjoyment," and "intention"; we must consider: (1) volition [QQ. 8-10]; (2) enjoyment [Q. 11] ; (3) intention [Q. 12] . Concerning the first, three things must be considered: (1) Of what things is the will? [Q. 8] ; (2) By what is the will moved? [Q. 9] ; (3) How is it moved? [Q. 10] ; QUESTION 8: OF THE…
ces of those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary [Q. 7] . [C. Acts of the Will with Regard to the End Q. 8: Of the Will, In Regard to What It Wills Q. 9: Of That Which Moves the Will Q. 10: Of the Manner in Which the Will is Moved ... ] QUESTION 6: OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY edit ^TOC ^a. The Nature of Voluntary Acts in General ↓B. Of the Circumstances of Human Acts Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts? (2) Whether in irrational animals? (3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action?…
refore there is something voluntary in human acts. I answer that, There must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every…
More questions about this book
- The prologue states the ultimate goal is to understand how human acts lead to or prevent happiness. How does Aquinas's meticulously detailed classification of acts, such as distinguishing "Acts of the Will with Regard to the End" from those "with Regard to the Means," directly serve this overarching purpose of achieving or avoiding happiness?
- Imagine explaining to someone unfamiliar with philosophy why Aquinas places such importance on differentiating between "Of the Good and Evil of Human Acts, in General" (Q. 18), "Of the Goodness and Malice of the Interior Act of the Will" (Q. 19), and "Of Goodness and Malice in External Human Actions" (Q. 20). What practical ethical problems would arise if these distinctions were blurred or ignored?
- The outline presents a sequence of "Elicited Voluntary Acts" including Enjoyment, Intention, Choice, Counsel, Consent, and Use. How do these concepts build upon each other, and what role does "Counsel" (Q. 14) specifically play in the process of arriving at a truly informed and deliberate "Choice" (Q. 13)?
- The prologue distinguishes between "acts proper to man" and "acts common to man and animals." Based on the subsequent detailed table of contents, what specific qualities or components of an act, according to Aquinas, elevate it from a merely "common" operation to one that is uniquely "proper to man"?