Summary
This text is a scholastic treatise on the division and moral evaluation of human acts, arguing that an act is properly "human" only when it is voluntary—that is, when its principle lies within the agent and the agent acts with knowledge of an end. The central argument is that voluntary acts are those whose intrinsic principle includes both movement and a directedness toward an end, requiring some knowledge of that end. The work systematically distinguishes between acts elicited directly by the will (e.g., enjoyment, intention, choice) and acts commanded by the will through other powers, then examines how goodness or evil is derived from an act's object, circumstances, and end. A reader takes away a precise taxonomy of moral action: that human acts are defined by voluntariness, that their moral species comes from their object, and that external acts must be judged in relation to the will's interior act.
Key concepts
- Voluntary act — An act whose principle is within the agent and is performed with knowledge of an end, making it properly human.
- Elicited voluntary acts — Acts that issue directly from the will itself, such as enjoyment, intention, choice, counsel, consent, and use.
- Commanded voluntary acts — Acts that issue from the will through the medium of other powers, being commanded by the will.
- Intrinsic principle — The source of movement within an agent that not only moves but moves for an end, requiring knowledge of that end.
- Good and evil of human acts — The moral quality of an act, derived from its object, circumstances, and end, determining its species as good or evil.
- Mover unmoved — The appetible object outside the agent that moves the appetite to act, as described by Aristotle.
From the book
Title: Actes humans by Han Kang, Alba Cunill Fulquet
Popular questions readers ask
- The prologue states the ultimate goal is to understand how human acts lead to or prevent happiness. How does Aquinas's meticulously detailed classification of acts, such as distinguishing "Acts of the Will with Regard to the End" from those "with Regard to the Means," directly serve this overarching purpose of achieving or avoiding happiness?
- Why does Aquinas dedicate separate inquiries to "That Which Moves the Will" (Q. 9) and "The Manner in Which the Will is Moved" (Q. 10)? What nuanced understanding of human agency is he trying to convey by making these distinct conceptual divisions, and how might they relate to the voluntary nature of actions?
- Imagine explaining to someone unfamiliar with philosophy why Aquinas places such importance on differentiating between "Of the Good and Evil of Human Acts, in General" (Q. 18), "Of the Goodness and Malice of the Interior Act of the Will" (Q. 19), and "Of Goodness and Malice in External Human Actions" (Q. 20). What practical ethical problems would arise if these distinctions were blurred or ignored?
- The outline presents a sequence of "Elicited Voluntary Acts" including Enjoyment, Intention, Choice, Counsel, Consent, and Use. How do these concepts build upon each other, and what role does "Counsel" (Q. 14) specifically play in the process of arriving at a truly informed and deliberate "Choice" (Q. 13)?
- The prologue distinguishes between "acts proper to man" and "acts common to man and animals." Based on the subsequent detailed table of contents, what specific qualities or components of an act, according to Aquinas, elevate it from a merely "common" operation to one that is uniquely "proper to man"?