Synthesized answer
Aquinas differentiates between the general good and evil of human acts [Q. 18], the goodness and malice of the interior act of the will [Q. 19], and the goodness and malice in external human actions [Q. 20] because these are distinct aspects of human action. The interior act of the will, which proceeds from the will and reason, is subject to goodness or malice [Passage 2]. Likewise, external actions are subject to goodness or malice [Passage 2]. The goodness of the will can depend on its object, reason, and conformity to the Divine Will [Passage 3]. The goodness or malice of an external action, on the other hand, can be influenced by circumstances [Passage 3].
If these distinctions were blurred, practical ethical problems could arise concerning the attribution of responsibility and the nature of moral evaluation. For instance, it is debated whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will or in the external action [Passage 5]. Additionally, it is questioned whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as those of the external action, as they may have different principles and subjects [Passage 2, Passage 4]. The passages suggest that while the act…
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
ies and form of an act are taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the object considered materially. To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when several people desire different things, but not under the same aspect: but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same aspect, one man wills a thing which another wills not. But there is no question of this here. ^Q. 19 QUESTION 20: OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN ACTIONS edit ^TOC ^d. The Division of Human Acts We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions:…
e good will, it must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act willed and from the end intended. Reply Obj. 2: A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end; but also when he wills an evil act. Reply Obj. 3: Voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed from the will and the reason. Consequently the difference of good and evil is applicable to both the interior and external act. ^Q. 20 Art. 3: Whether the goodness and malice of the external action are the same as those of the interior act? edit…
thing else. In like manner a circumstance does not always add further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for as much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice, it does not always change the species of good or evil. ^Q. 18 QUESTION 19: OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL edit ^TOC ^d. The Division of Human Acts We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will; under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object? (2) Whether it depends on the object alone? (3)…
ver, it is the action which is the subject of goodness or malice: and the same accident cannot be in different subjects. Therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot be the same as that of the external action. Obj. 2: Further, "A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and renders its action good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). But the intellective virtue in the commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in the power commanded, as is declared in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the goodness of the interior act, which belongs to the commanding power, is distinct from the goodness of the external…
nal action increase its goodness or malice? (6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil? Art. 1: Whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will, or in the external action? edit It would seem that good and evil are in the external action prior to being in the act of the will. Obj. 1: For the will derives goodness from its object, as stated above (Q. 19, AA. 1, 2). But the external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for a man is said to will to commit a theft, or to will to give an alms. Therefore good and evil are in the external…
More questions about this book
- The prologue states the ultimate goal is to understand how human acts lead to or prevent happiness. How does Aquinas's meticulously detailed classification of acts, such as distinguishing "Acts of the Will with Regard to the End" from those "with Regard to the Means," directly serve this overarching purpose of achieving or avoiding happiness?
- Why does Aquinas dedicate separate inquiries to "That Which Moves the Will" (Q. 9) and "The Manner in Which the Will is Moved" (Q. 10)? What nuanced understanding of human agency is he trying to convey by making these distinct conceptual divisions, and how might they relate to the voluntary nature of actions?
- The outline presents a sequence of "Elicited Voluntary Acts" including Enjoyment, Intention, Choice, Counsel, Consent, and Use. How do these concepts build upon each other, and what role does "Counsel" (Q. 14) specifically play in the process of arriving at a truly informed and deliberate "Choice" (Q. 13)?
- The prologue distinguishes between "acts proper to man" and "acts common to man and animals." Based on the subsequent detailed table of contents, what specific qualities or components of an act, according to Aquinas, elevate it from a merely "common" operation to one that is uniquely "proper to man"?