Synthesized answer
According to Aquinas, acts that are "proper to man" are distinguished from those "common to man and animals" by their voluntary nature, stemming from the will, which is a rational appetite proper to humans [1, 2]. Specifically, human acts are voluntary because they are either elicited by the will or commanded by the will through other powers [2].
The passages indicate that human acts are considered voluntary in general, and then further examined in terms of those elicited by the will (such as enjoyment, intention, choice, counsel, consent, and use) and those commanded by the will [2, 3]. The ordaining of a movement, whether of oneself or another, to an end is identified as belonging to reason alone and as a way of intending an end "properly and principally," which irrational animals do not do [5]. This capacity for reasoned intention and the involvement of the will elevate an act to be proper to man [1, 2, 5]. The passages do not further elaborate on other specific qualities or components that distinguish these acts beyond their voluntary nature and connection to reason and the will.
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
ned with things singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the general principles; and secondly matters of detail. In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves [QQ. 6-48]; [Treatise on Human Acts (part 1) (QQ. 6-21) Treatise on Human Acts (part 2) (QQ. 22-48) ] (2) their principles [QQ. 49-114]. [Treatise on Habits (QQ. 49-89) Treatise on Law (QQ. 90-108) Treatise on…
ns [QQ. 22-48] . The first of these points offers a twofold consideration: (1) What makes a human act? [QQ. 6-17][ a.-c. ] (2) What distinguishes human acts? [QQ. 18-21][ d. ] And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary. First, then, we must consider [ a. ] the voluntary and involuntary in general [QQ. 6-10] ; secondly, [ b. ] those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately [QQ. 11-16] ;…
ch the Will is Moved b. Elicited Voluntary Acts Q. 11: Of Enjoyment, Which Is an Act of the Will Q. 12: Of Intention [D. Acts of the Will with Regard to the Means ] Q. 13: Of Choice, Which Is an Act of the Will with Regard to the Means Q. 14: Of Counsel, Which Precedes Choice Q. 15: Of Consent, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means Q. 16: Of Use, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means c. Commanded Voluntary Acts Q. 17: Of the Acts Commanded by the Will d. The Division of Human Acts Q. 18: Of the Good and Evil of Human Acts, in General Q. 19: Of the Goodness and Malice…
hey have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural, as stated above (Reply Obj. 2). ^Q. 17 THE DIVISION OF HUMAN ACTS edit ^TOC ^^c. Commanded Voluntary Acts We must now consider the good and evil of human acts. First, how a human act is good or evil [QQ. 18-20] ; secondly, what results from the good or evil of a human act, as merit or demerit, sin and guilt [Q. 21]. Under the first head there will be a threefold consideration: the first will be of the good and evil of human acts, in general [Q. 18]; the second, of the good and evil of internal acts [Q. 19];…
according as he ordains the movement of something, either his own or another's, to an end. This belongs to reason alone. Wherefore irrational animals do not intend an end in this way, which is to intend properly and principally, as stated above (A. 1). Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes intention in the sense of being moved to an end. Reply Obj. 2: Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end. Reply Obj. 3: Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement; this…
More questions about this book
- The prologue states the ultimate goal is to understand how human acts lead to or prevent happiness. How does Aquinas's meticulously detailed classification of acts, such as distinguishing "Acts of the Will with Regard to the End" from those "with Regard to the Means," directly serve this overarching purpose of achieving or avoiding happiness?
- Why does Aquinas dedicate separate inquiries to "That Which Moves the Will" (Q. 9) and "The Manner in Which the Will is Moved" (Q. 10)? What nuanced understanding of human agency is he trying to convey by making these distinct conceptual divisions, and how might they relate to the voluntary nature of actions?
- Imagine explaining to someone unfamiliar with philosophy why Aquinas places such importance on differentiating between "Of the Good and Evil of Human Acts, in General" (Q. 18), "Of the Goodness and Malice of the Interior Act of the Will" (Q. 19), and "Of Goodness and Malice in External Human Actions" (Q. 20). What practical ethical problems would arise if these distinctions were blurred or ignored?
- The outline presents a sequence of "Elicited Voluntary Acts" including Enjoyment, Intention, Choice, Counsel, Consent, and Use. How do these concepts build upon each other, and what role does "Counsel" (Q. 14) specifically play in the process of arriving at a truly informed and deliberate "Choice" (Q. 13)?