Synthesized answer
According to the passages, the sequence of "Elicited Voluntary Acts" with regard to the means is: choice, counsel, consent, and use [1][4]. Counsel (Q. 14) is described as an inquiry that precedes choice [2][4]. The passages state that "choice is preceded by counsel" [1][4], and that "the desire of the means presupposes the decision of counsel" [5]. This indicates that counsel provides the reasoned judgment that the will then selects in the act of choice.
The specific role of counsel in arriving at a truly informed and deliberate choice is that counsel is an "inquiry" [2] about the means to an end. The order of action is: first apprehension of the end, then desire of the end, then "counsel about the means," then "desire of the means" [5]. Consent is described as "the application of the appetitive movement to the judgment resulting from counsel" [5]. Thus, counsel supplies the deliberative judgment, and choice (Q. 13) is the act of the will that selects from among the options that counsel has examined. The passages do not provide further detail on how choice itself builds on counsel beyond stating this sequential relationship.
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
nd to use. And choice is preceded by counsel. First of all, then, we must consider choice [Q. 13]; secondly, counsel [Q. 14]; thirdly, consent [Q. 15]; fourthly, use [Q. 16]. QUESTION 13: OF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD TO THE MEANS edit ^TOC ^b. Elicited Voluntary Acts ^D. Acts of the Will with Regard to the Means Concerning choice there are six points of inquiry: (1) Of what power is it the act; of the will or of the reason? (2) Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals? (3) Whether choice is only the means, or sometimes also of the end? (4) Whether choice is…
absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally; as, for instance, "If he runs, he is in motion." Reply Obj. 3: If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than towards the other. ^Q. 13 QUESTION 14: OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE edit ^TOC ^b. Elicited Voluntary Acts ^D. Acts of the Will with Regard to the Means We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether counsel is an inquiry? (2)…
ch the Will is Moved b. Elicited Voluntary Acts Q. 11: Of Enjoyment, Which Is an Act of the Will Q. 12: Of Intention [D. Acts of the Will with Regard to the Means ] Q. 13: Of Choice, Which Is an Act of the Will with Regard to the Means Q. 14: Of Counsel, Which Precedes Choice Q. 15: Of Consent, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means Q. 16: Of Use, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means c. Commanded Voluntary Acts Q. 17: Of the Acts Commanded by the Will d. The Division of Human Acts Q. 18: Of the Good and Evil of Human Acts, in General Q. 19: Of the Goodness and Malice…
according as he ordains the movement of something, either his own or another's, to an end. This belongs to reason alone. Wherefore irrational animals do not intend an end in this way, which is to intend properly and principally, as stated above (A. 1). Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes intention in the sense of being moved to an end. Reply Obj. 2: Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end. Reply Obj. 3: Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement; this…
s and embraces the judgment of his counsel." But counsel is only about the means. Therefore the same applies to consent. I answer that, Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of him who causes the application. Now the order of action is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel about the means; then the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends to the last end naturally: wherefore the application of the appetitive movement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but of…
More questions about this book
- The prologue states the ultimate goal is to understand how human acts lead to or prevent happiness. How does Aquinas's meticulously detailed classification of acts, such as distinguishing "Acts of the Will with Regard to the End" from those "with Regard to the Means," directly serve this overarching purpose of achieving or avoiding happiness?
- Why does Aquinas dedicate separate inquiries to "That Which Moves the Will" (Q. 9) and "The Manner in Which the Will is Moved" (Q. 10)? What nuanced understanding of human agency is he trying to convey by making these distinct conceptual divisions, and how might they relate to the voluntary nature of actions?
- Imagine explaining to someone unfamiliar with philosophy why Aquinas places such importance on differentiating between "Of the Good and Evil of Human Acts, in General" (Q. 18), "Of the Goodness and Malice of the Interior Act of the Will" (Q. 19), and "Of Goodness and Malice in External Human Actions" (Q. 20). What practical ethical problems would arise if these distinctions were blurred or ignored?
- The prologue distinguishes between "acts proper to man" and "acts common to man and animals." Based on the subsequent detailed table of contents, what specific qualities or components of an act, according to Aquinas, elevate it from a merely "common" operation to one that is uniquely "proper to man"?