Synthesized answer
The passages do not directly discuss Bishop Butler's epigraph or its influence on Moore's pursuit to define "that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them." However, they do show Moore's approach to defining the subject-matter of ethics. Moore states that the first conclusion is that there is "a simple, indefinable, unanalysable object of thought" by which ethics must be defined [1]. This aligns with Butler's idea that "everything is what it is," because Moore insists that "good" means just "good" and nothing else—it is indefinable, just as "yellow" means "yellow" and nothing else [2].
Moore's pursuit of what is "common and peculiar" to ethical judgments [3] leads him to identify "good" as the only simple object of thought peculiar to ethics [4]. The influence of Butler's epigraph is implicit: by accepting that each thing is itself and not another, Moore rejects the naturalistic fallacy—the mistake of defining "good" in terms of something else (e.g., pleasure or desire) [5]. Thus, the epigraph supports Moore's view that "good" cannot be reduced to any other property; it must be recognized as a unique, simple object.
The passages do not…
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
end our ethical principles in any way whatever, we shall also be much less apt to defend them well, even if illogically. For we shall start with the conviction that good must mean so and so, and shall therefore be inclined either to misunderstand our opponent’s arguments or to cut them short with the reply, ‘This is not an open question: the very meaning of the word decides it; no one can think otherwise except through confusion.’ 15 . Our first conclusion as to the subject-matter of Ethics is, then, that there is a simple, indefinable, unanalysable object of thought by reference to which…
what I do care about is the fallacy. It does not matter what we call it, provided we recognise it when we meet with it. It is to be met with in almost every book on Ethics; and yet it is not recognised: and that is why it is necessary to multiply illustrations of it, and convenient to give it a name. It is a very simple fallacy indeed. When we say that an orange is yellow, we do not think our statement binds us to hold that ‘orange’ means nothing else than ‘yellow,’ or that nothing can be yellow but an orange. Supposing the orange is also sweet! Does that bind us to say that ‘sweet’ is…
sing a point of Ethics. So much as this is not disputed; but it falls very far short of defining the province of Ethics. That province may indeed be defined as the whole truth about that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them. But we have still to ask the question: What is it that is thus common and peculiar? And this is a question to which very different answers have been given by ethical philosophers of acknowledged reputation, and none of them, perhaps, completely satisfactory. 2 . If we take such examples as those given above, we shall not be far wrong…
er meaning. We may, in the third place, mean to ask, not what thing or things are good, but how ‘good’ is to be defined. This is an enquiry which belongs only to Ethics, not to Casuistry; and this is the enquiry which will occupy us first. It is an enquiry to which most special attention should be directed; since this question, how ‘good’ is to be defined, is the most fundamental question in all Ethics. That which is meant by ‘good’ is, in fact, except its converse ‘bad,’ the only simple object of thought which is peculiar to Ethics. Its definition is, therefore, the most essential point in…
of things—an assumption which is mainly due to two erroneous doctrines, the first logical , the second epistemological . Hence (3) I discussed the logical doctrine that all properties assert a relation between existents; and pointed out that the assimilation of ethical propositions either to natural laws or to commands are instances of this logical fallacy (72—76). And finally (4) I discussed the epistemological doctrine that to be good is equivalent to being willed or felt in some particular way; a doctrine which derives support from the analogous error, which Kant regarded as the cardinal…
More questions about this book
- Moore provides examples of everyday ethical judgments. How would you explain to someone unfamiliar with philosophy what makes these specific judgments—and not others—the "business of Ethics," and why does Moore immediately indicate that this initial understanding is incomplete?
- Moore distinguishes between merely making an ethical judgment (e.g., "That fellow is a villain") and the *business* of Ethics (discussing its truth, giving reasons). What is the critical difference between these two activities, and what does this distinction reveal about the intellectual task Moore is undertaking?
- Moore states that defining the "province of Ethics" requires identifying "the whole truth about that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them." Explain why this specific formulation makes the task of defining ethics significantly more challenging than simply listing examples, and what the philosophical implications are if this "common and peculiar" aspect remains elusive.
- If, as Moore notes, reputable ethical philosophers have given "very different answers" to the fundamental question of what is common and peculiar to ethical judgments, what are some of the potential underlying philosophical debates or frameworks that might lead to such divergent conclusions?