Synthesized answer
According to Moore, merely making an ethical judgment (e.g., “That fellow is a villain”) is a common everyday statement, while the *business* of Ethics is to “discuss such questions and such statements; to argue what is the true answer… and to give reasons for thinking that our statements… are true or false” [1]. The critical difference is that Ethics involves a deliberate, reasoned inquiry into the truth of these judgments, not just their utterance. Moore emphasizes that “it is not the business of the ethical philosopher to give personal advice or exhortation” [2]; instead, the intellectual task is to analyze and defend ethical principles logically, avoiding the mistake of assuming that “good *must* mean so and so” [3].
This distinction reveals that Moore is undertaking a rigorous, philosophical investigation of the subject-matter of Ethics itself. He seeks to define what is “common and peculiar” to all ethical judgments [4], and to clarify whether terms like “good” refer to something as an end or merely as a means [5]. The passages show that Moore’s task is to move beyond casual moralizing and toward a precise, analytical definition of ethical concepts, particularly the simple,…
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
← Contents Principia Ethica by George Edward Moore Chapter I Chapter II → 367337 Principia Ethica — Chapter I George Edward Moore Layout 2 CHAPTER I. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS. 1 . It is very easy to point out some among our every-day judgments, with the truth of which Ethics is undoubtedly concerned. Whenever we say, ‘So and so is a good man,’ or ‘That fellow is a villain’; whenever we ask, ‘What ought I to do?’ or ‘Is it wrong for me to do like this?’; whenever we hazard such remarks as ‘Temperance is a virtue and drunkenness a vice’—it is undoubtedly the business of Ethics to discuss…
ly particular; facts with which such studies as history, geography, astronomy, are compelled, in part at least, to deal. And, for this reason, it is not the business of the ethical philosopher to give personal advice or exhortation. 4 . But there is another meaning which may be given to the question ‘What is good?’ ‘Books are good’ would be an answer to it, though an answer obviously false; for some books are very bad indeed. And ethical judgments of this kind do indeed belong to Ethics; though I shall not deal with many of them. Such is the judgment ‘Pleasure is good’—a judgment, of which…
end our ethical principles in any way whatever, we shall also be much less apt to defend them well, even if illogically. For we shall start with the conviction that good must mean so and so, and shall therefore be inclined either to misunderstand our opponent’s arguments or to cut them short with the reply, ‘This is not an open question: the very meaning of the word decides it; no one can think otherwise except through confusion.’ 15 . Our first conclusion as to the subject-matter of Ethics is, then, that there is a simple, indefinable, unanalysable object of thought by reference to which…
sing a point of Ethics. So much as this is not disputed; but it falls very far short of defining the province of Ethics. That province may indeed be defined as the whole truth about that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them. But we have still to ask the question: What is it that is thus common and peculiar? And this is a question to which very different answers have been given by ethical philosophers of acknowledged reputation, and none of them, perhaps, completely satisfactory. 2 . If we take such examples as those given above, we shall not be far wrong…
both cases we commonly say ‘Such and such a thing is good.’ But in the one case ‘good’ will mean ‘good as means,’ i.e . merely that the thing is a means to good—will have good effects: in the other case it will mean ‘good as end’—we shall be judging that the thing itself has the property which, in the first case, we asserted only to belong to its effects. It is plain that these are very different assertions to make about a thing; it is plain that either or both of them may be made, both truly and falsely, about all manner of things; and it is certain that unless we are clear as to which of…
More questions about this book
- Moore provides examples of everyday ethical judgments. How would you explain to someone unfamiliar with philosophy what makes these specific judgments—and not others—the "business of Ethics," and why does Moore immediately indicate that this initial understanding is incomplete?
- The text introduces Bishop Butler's epigraph: "Everything is what it is, and not another thing." In what ways might this foundational statement influence Moore's subsequent pursuit to define "that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them" in ethics?
- Moore states that defining the "province of Ethics" requires identifying "the whole truth about that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them." Explain why this specific formulation makes the task of defining ethics significantly more challenging than simply listing examples, and what the philosophical implications are if this "common and peculiar" aspect remains elusive.
- If, as Moore notes, reputable ethical philosophers have given "very different answers" to the fundamental question of what is common and peculiar to ethical judgments, what are some of the potential underlying philosophical debates or frameworks that might lead to such divergent conclusions?