Ethica (Ethics)

Summary

George Edward Moore's *Principia Ethica* argues that the fundamental subject of ethics is the investigation of the property denoted by the term "good," which he claims is simple, indefinable, and cannot be equated with any natural property or object of desire. Moore contends that ethical propositions are not reducible to natural laws, commands, or feelings—a fallacy he calls the "naturalistic fallacy." He distinguishes between two kinds of ethical truths: those asserting what things are good in themselves (intrinsic value) and those asserting causal relations between actions and good results (means to good). Moore insists that proving any action is a duty requires both causal truths about its effects and self-evident ethical truths about what is intrinsically good. The book systematically critiques previous ethical systems for offering irrelevant evidence and confusing the question of what "good" means with other questions. Readers take away a rigorous method for distinguishing intrinsic goods from mere means, and a clear standard for evaluating moral arguments.

Key concepts

• Naturalistic fallacy — The erroneous doctrine that "good" can be defined in terms of natural properties, such as being willed, felt, or desired in a particular way.
• Intrinsic good — The simple, indefinable property that things possess in themselves, which ethics must investigate by asserting what things are good or bad in themselves.
• Causal relation (means to good) — A type of ethical assertion that connects actions or dispositions to their tendency to produce things that are intrinsically good.
• Self-evident ethical truths — Propositions of the first kind that assert what things are good in themselves, requiring no further evidence beyond their own nature.
• Duty — An action that must be shown to be a cause of or means to intrinsic good, requiring both causal truths and ethical truths of the self-evident class.
• Virtue — A permanent disposition to perform duties, which is good as a means if it fulfills conditions for producing intrinsic good, but generally has no value in itself.

Popular questions readers ask

• Moore provides examples of everyday ethical judgments. How would you explain to someone unfamiliar with philosophy what makes these specific judgments—and not others—the "business of Ethics," and why does Moore immediately indicate that this initial understanding is incomplete?
• The text introduces Bishop Butler's epigraph: "Everything is what it is, and not another thing." In what ways might this foundational statement influence Moore's subsequent pursuit to define "that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them" in ethics?
• Moore distinguishes between merely making an ethical judgment (e.g., "That fellow is a villain") and the *business* of Ethics (discussing its truth, giving reasons). What is the critical difference between these two activities, and what does this distinction reveal about the intellectual task Moore is undertaking?
• Moore states that defining the "province of Ethics" requires identifying "the whole truth about that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them." Explain why this specific formulation makes the task of defining ethics significantly more challenging than simply listing examples, and what the philosophical implications are if this "common and peculiar" aspect remains elusive.
• If, as Moore notes, reputable ethical philosophers have given "very different answers" to the fundamental question of what is common and peculiar to ethical judgments, what are some of the potential underlying philosophical debates or frameworks that might lead to such divergent conclusions?