Synthesized answer
The passages indicate that divergent answers to the fundamental question of what is common and peculiar to ethical judgments arise from several underlying philosophical debates and frameworks. One key issue is the failure to distinguish between two distinct types of ethical questions: judgments of what is good in itself (intrinsic value) and causal judgments about what produces good results as a means [1]. This ambiguity leads philosophers to conflate questions of duty, rightness, and what we ought to aim for, without separating the two components [1].
Another major source of disagreement is the "naturalistic fallacy," where ethical writers assume that the notion of intrinsic value can be defined in terms of something else (like virtue or pleasure), failing to recognize that it is simple and unique [4]. This fallacy, combined with a failure to clearly distinguish means from ends, results in philosophers discussing "What ought we to do?" without specifying whether the answer is based on intrinsic value or instrumental value [4]. Additionally, the passages note that ethical discussions often focus narrowly on human conduct, but the fundamental question of what is common and…
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
se we may ask both how far they are good in themselves and how far they have a general tendency to produce good results. And the arguments brought forward in ethical discussion have always been of both classes—both such as would prove the conduct in question to be good in itself and such as would prove it to be good as a means. But that these are the only questions which any ethical discussion can have to settle, and that to settle the one is not the same thing as to settle the other—these two fundamental facts have in general escaped the notice of ethical philosophers. Ethical questions are…
sing a point of Ethics. So much as this is not disputed; but it falls very far short of defining the province of Ethics. That province may indeed be defined as the whole truth about that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them. But we have still to ask the question: What is it that is thus common and peculiar? And this is a question to which very different answers have been given by ethical philosophers of acknowledged reputation, and none of them, perhaps, completely satisfactory. 2 . If we take such examples as those given above, we shall not be far wrong…
s, which it is very important to distinguish, if we are to have a complete definition of the range of ethical judgments. Before I proceeded to argue that there was such an indefinable notion involved in ethical notions, I stated (§ 4) that it was necessary for Ethics to enumerate all true universal judgments, asserting that such and such a thing was good, whenever it occurred. But, although all such judgments do refer to that unique notion which I have called ‘good,’ they do not all refer to it in the same way. They may either assert that this unique property does always attach to the thing…
ussed the question what is good in itself at all, they have generally assumed that it must be either virtue or pleasure. It would hardly have been possible that such a gross difference of opinion should exist, or that it should have been assumed the discussion must be limited to two such alternatives, if the meaning of the question had been clearly apprehended. And we have already seen that the meaning of the question has hardly ever been clearly apprehended. Almost all ethical writers have committed the naturalistic fallacy—they have failed to perceive that the notion of intrinsic value is…
e no intrinsic value whatsoever; that it is perfectly virtuous may mean merely that it causes the best possible effects. And with regard to the latter, these best possible results which justify our action can, in any case, have only so much of intrinsic value as the laws of nature allow us to secure; and they in their turn may have no intrinsic value whatsoever, but may merely be a means to the attainment (in a still further future) of something that has such value. Whenever, therefore, we ask ‘What ought we to do?’ or ‘What ought we to try to get?’ we are asking questions which involve a…
More questions about this book
- Moore provides examples of everyday ethical judgments. How would you explain to someone unfamiliar with philosophy what makes these specific judgments—and not others—the "business of Ethics," and why does Moore immediately indicate that this initial understanding is incomplete?
- The text introduces Bishop Butler's epigraph: "Everything is what it is, and not another thing." In what ways might this foundational statement influence Moore's subsequent pursuit to define "that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them" in ethics?
- Moore distinguishes between merely making an ethical judgment (e.g., "That fellow is a villain") and the *business* of Ethics (discussing its truth, giving reasons). What is the critical difference between these two activities, and what does this distinction reveal about the intellectual task Moore is undertaking?
- Moore states that defining the "province of Ethics" requires identifying "the whole truth about that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them." Explain why this specific formulation makes the task of defining ethics significantly more challenging than simply listing examples, and what the philosophical implications are if this "common and peculiar" aspect remains elusive.