Synthesized answer
According to the passages, Moore explains that everyday ethical judgments—such as “So and so is a good man,” “What ought I to do?” or “Temperance is a virtue and drunkenness a vice”—are the “business of Ethics” because they involve terms like “virtue,” “vice,” “duty,” “right,” “ought,” “good,” and “bad,” and discussing their truth constitutes a point of Ethics [2]. These judgments are commonly concerned with the question of “conduct”—what is good or bad, right or wrong in human behavior [1]. This makes them the province of Ethics, as that name is most intimately associated with the discussion of human conduct [1].
However, Moore immediately indicates that this initial understanding is incomplete. He states that saying these judgments are the business of Ethics “falls very far short of defining the province of Ethics” [2]. The province must be defined as “the whole truth about that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them,” but the question of what is common and peculiar has received different and unsatisfactory answers from ethical philosophers [1]. Thus, the initial focus on conduct is only a starting point, not a complete definition.
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
sing a point of Ethics. So much as this is not disputed; but it falls very far short of defining the province of Ethics. That province may indeed be defined as the whole truth about that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them. But we have still to ask the question: What is it that is thus common and peculiar? And this is a question to which very different answers have been given by ethical philosophers of acknowledged reputation, and none of them, perhaps, completely satisfactory. 2 . If we take such examples as those given above, we shall not be far wrong…
← Contents Principia Ethica by George Edward Moore Chapter I Chapter II → 367337 Principia Ethica — Chapter I George Edward Moore Layout 2 CHAPTER I. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS. 1 . It is very easy to point out some among our every-day judgments, with the truth of which Ethics is undoubtedly concerned. Whenever we say, ‘So and so is a good man,’ or ‘That fellow is a villain’; whenever we ask, ‘What ought I to do?’ or ‘Is it wrong for me to do like this?’; whenever we hazard such remarks as ‘Temperance is a virtue and drunkenness a vice’—it is undoubtedly the business of Ethics to discuss…
ly particular; facts with which such studies as history, geography, astronomy, are compelled, in part at least, to deal. And, for this reason, it is not the business of the ethical philosopher to give personal advice or exhortation. 4 . But there is another meaning which may be given to the question ‘What is good?’ ‘Books are good’ would be an answer to it, though an answer obviously false; for some books are very bad indeed. And ethical judgments of this kind do indeed belong to Ethics; though I shall not deal with many of them. Such is the judgment ‘Pleasure is good’—a judgment, of which…
end our ethical principles in any way whatever, we shall also be much less apt to defend them well, even if illogically. For we shall start with the conviction that good must mean so and so, and shall therefore be inclined either to misunderstand our opponent’s arguments or to cut them short with the reply, ‘This is not an open question: the very meaning of the word decides it; no one can think otherwise except through confusion.’ 15 . Our first conclusion as to the subject-matter of Ethics is, then, that there is a simple, indefinable, unanalysable object of thought by reference to which…
od conduct really is. This is a mistake which many writers have actually made, from limiting their enquiry to conduct. And hence I shall try to avoid it by considering first what is good in general; hoping, that if we can arrive at any certainty about this, it will be much easier to settle the question of good conduct; for we all know pretty well what ‘conduct’ is. This, then, is our first question: What is good? and What is bad? and to the discussion of this question (or these questions) I give the name of Ethics, since that science must, at all events, include it. 3 . But this is a…
More questions about this book
- The text introduces Bishop Butler's epigraph: "Everything is what it is, and not another thing." In what ways might this foundational statement influence Moore's subsequent pursuit to define "that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them" in ethics?
- Moore distinguishes between merely making an ethical judgment (e.g., "That fellow is a villain") and the *business* of Ethics (discussing its truth, giving reasons). What is the critical difference between these two activities, and what does this distinction reveal about the intellectual task Moore is undertaking?
- Moore states that defining the "province of Ethics" requires identifying "the whole truth about that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them." Explain why this specific formulation makes the task of defining ethics significantly more challenging than simply listing examples, and what the philosophical implications are if this "common and peculiar" aspect remains elusive.
- If, as Moore notes, reputable ethical philosophers have given "very different answers" to the fundamental question of what is common and peculiar to ethical judgments, what are some of the potential underlying philosophical debates or frameworks that might lead to such divergent conclusions?