Synthesized answer
The passages show that this case has broader implications for creators and licensees in two key areas. First, it establishes that a general grant of rights, such as "motion picture rights," can be broad enough to cover future technologies like videocassettes, even if those technologies were unknown at the time of the agreement [1]. The court rejected the argument that unknown technologies cannot be included, noting that home viewing of motion pictures was within the industry's contemplation during the 1930s, as evidenced by Disney's early short subject cartoons for home viewing and ongoing development of non-celluloid storage methods [1].
Second, the case underscores the importance of precise language in copyright agreements. Bourne argued that the absence of an express grant of television rights in the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement, compared to the 1933 Shorts Agreement, indicated a narrow transfer of rights [4]. However, the court focused on whether the language of the grant was "reasonably broad enough" to cover the new use, and whether the possibility of such use was recognized by industry experts [3]. This means that licensees should use explicit, forward-looking language to…
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From the book
panying sounds, if any.”) Accordingly, we agree with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Bloom v. Hearst Entertainment, Inc. , 33 F.3d 518, 525 (5th Cir.1994), in which the court held that “a general grant of motion picture rights is potentially broad enough to contemplate … [videocassettes] as [a] means of distribution.” Insofar as Bourne contends that, because videocassettes were unknown at the time of the agreement, their use could not have been within the contemplation of the parties, we disagree. While the specific technology underlying todays VCR’s was not available during the 1930s, Disney…
hat video cassette recorders (“VCRs”) and videocassettes were unknown commercially at the time the agreement was signed. Bourne argues that both the First and Ninth Circuits, as well as the New York state courts, have held “that rights to future technologies such as videocassette recording are not conveyed where the technology was unknown at the time the parties entered into the bargain and no broad license of rights exists.” In making this argument, Bourne relies on a line of cases which essentially have held that the grant of television rights does not include home videocassette rights. See…
, testified regarding the non-celluloid methods of storing motion pictures that were under development during the 1930s. Having concluded that the language of the grant to Disney reasonably is broad enough to cover videocassettes and that the possibility that Disney could market its motion pictures for home viewing was recognized by persons knowledgeable in the entertainment and motion picture industries, we believe that the district court properly submitted to the jury the question of whether the 1933 Shorts Agreement and the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement provided Disney with the right to…
by the testimony of Bourne’s expert witness, Renville McMann, Jr., an expert in television and videocassette technology. Bourne also relies on the fact that the 1933 Shorts Agreement specifically gave Disney the right to use the Compositions on television, while the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement did not expressly grant Disney television rights. From this, Bourne asks us to infer that the parties intended only a narrow transfer of rights in the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement. Bourne also asks us to infer that the parties perceived a difference between a motion picture and the broadcast of the same on…
isney and Bourne that Disney’s rights to the Snow White compositions were to be controlled by the 1933 Shorts Agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that, while the compositions from Snow White do not fall explicitly within the scope of the 1933 Shorts Agreement, the jury reasonably could have found that the parties implicitly incorporated the grant-back provision of the 1933 Shorts Agreement into the 1937 Assignment Agreement. Therefore, the district court did not err in submitting this matter to the jury. b. Disney’s Rights to Produce Videocassettes Bourne argues that the district court also…
More questions about this book
- Explain, as if to a non-lawyer, the fundamental disagreement between Bourne and Disney regarding the distribution of music from "Pinocchio" versus "Snow White," highlighting the key legal distinction between the two.
- Trace the chain of ownership and licensing agreements for the musical compositions from their creation in the 1930s up to the point of this 1995 lawsuit. Why did Disney's original assignment of copyright become the central issue?
- Deconstruct the phrase "in synchronism with any and all of the motion pictures which may be made by [Disney]." How did Bourne interpret this clause, and what specific technological development made this interpretation crucial to their claim against Disney?
- If you were counseling Disney in the 1930s, based on the arguments made in this 1995 case, what specific contractual language would you have insisted upon to protect Disney's rights for future distribution formats, and why would that language be critical?