Synthesized answer
Based on the arguments made in these passages, if you were counseling Disney in the 1930s, you would have insisted on contractual language that broadly defined "motion picture" to encompass future distribution formats beyond theatrical exhibition and specific technologies like celluloid film. This would be critical to protect Disney's rights for future distribution formats because the passages highlight disputes arising from the interpretation of terms like "motion picture" when new technologies like videocassettes emerged [4]. Bourne, for example, argued that "motion picture" was understood to mean theatrical exhibition of celluloid film, implying a narrow transfer of rights [4].
To avoid such disputes, you would have insisted on language that explicitly included or broadly contemplated any and all means of distribution and exhibition, whether now known or hereafter developed. The passages indicate that while videocassettes were unknown commercially, the concept of home viewing of motion pictures and non-celluloid storage methods were within the contemplation of the industry during the 1930s [1, 5]. Therefore, language that broadly covers "any and all motion pictures" or "any…
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From the book
panying sounds, if any.”) Accordingly, we agree with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Bloom v. Hearst Entertainment, Inc. , 33 F.3d 518, 525 (5th Cir.1994), in which the court held that “a general grant of motion picture rights is potentially broad enough to contemplate … [videocassettes] as [a] means of distribution.” Insofar as Bourne contends that, because videocassettes were unknown at the time of the agreement, their use could not have been within the contemplation of the parties, we disagree. While the specific technology underlying todays VCR’s was not available during the 1930s, Disney…
by the testimony of Bourne’s expert witness, Renville McMann, Jr., an expert in television and videocassette technology. Bourne also relies on the fact that the 1933 Shorts Agreement specifically gave Disney the right to use the Compositions on television, while the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement did not expressly grant Disney television rights. From this, Bourne asks us to infer that the parties intended only a narrow transfer of rights in the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement. Bourne also asks us to infer that the parties perceived a difference between a motion picture and the broadcast of the same on…
isney and Bourne that Disney’s rights to the Snow White compositions were to be controlled by the 1933 Shorts Agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that, while the compositions from Snow White do not fall explicitly within the scope of the 1933 Shorts Agreement, the jury reasonably could have found that the parties implicitly incorporated the grant-back provision of the 1933 Shorts Agreement into the 1937 Assignment Agreement. Therefore, the district court did not err in submitting this matter to the jury. b. Disney’s Rights to Produce Videocassettes Bourne argues that the district court also…
ompositions … in synchronism with any and all of the motion pictures which may be made by [Disney] . ” (emphasis added). Similarly, the 1933 Shorts Agreement, which we believe also controlled Disney’s rights with respect to the compositions from Snow White, granted to Disney “the right to record such music mechanically in any and all other motion pictures to be produced by [Disney] . ” (emphasis added). As is apparent from the emphasized portions of the quoted language, the issue is whether, as Bourne contends, the term “motion picture” unambiguously excludes home videocassettes. In support…
, testified regarding the non-celluloid methods of storing motion pictures that were under development during the 1930s. Having concluded that the language of the grant to Disney reasonably is broad enough to cover videocassettes and that the possibility that Disney could market its motion pictures for home viewing was recognized by persons knowledgeable in the entertainment and motion picture industries, we believe that the district court properly submitted to the jury the question of whether the 1933 Shorts Agreement and the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement provided Disney with the right to…
More questions about this book
- Explain, as if to a non-lawyer, the fundamental disagreement between Bourne and Disney regarding the distribution of music from "Pinocchio" versus "Snow White," highlighting the key legal distinction between the two.
- Trace the chain of ownership and licensing agreements for the musical compositions from their creation in the 1930s up to the point of this 1995 lawsuit. Why did Disney's original assignment of copyright become the central issue?
- Deconstruct the phrase "in synchronism with any and all of the motion pictures which may be made by [Disney]." How did Bourne interpret this clause, and what specific technological development made this interpretation crucial to their claim against Disney?
- What broader implications does this case have for creators and licensees in predicting future technological advancements and the need for precise language in copyright agreements?