Synthesized answer
Bourne interpreted the phrase "in synchronism with any and all of the motion pictures which may be made by [Disney]" to exclude home videocassettes [1]. Bourne argued that the term "motion picture" during the 1930s referred to the exhibition of projected images from celluloid film in a theater, thus signifying a specific medium of distribution rather than the content itself [1]. Bourne further contended that Disney needed two separate grants: one to record music in synchronization with motion pictures and another distinct right to sell or distribute videocassettes containing synchronized compositions [3].
The crucial technological development that made this interpretation critical to Bourne's claim was the advent of home videocassettes [1, 2]. Bourne's argument hinged on the idea that videocassettes were unknown and not contemplated at the time of the agreements, and therefore not covered by the term "motion picture" as it was understood then [1, 4]. However, Disney presented evidence that non-celluloid methods of storing motion pictures were under development in the 1930s, and that home viewing of motion pictures was within the contemplation of industry professionals at that…
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From the book
ompositions … in synchronism with any and all of the motion pictures which may be made by [Disney] . ” (emphasis added). Similarly, the 1933 Shorts Agreement, which we believe also controlled Disney’s rights with respect to the compositions from Snow White, granted to Disney “the right to record such music mechanically in any and all other motion pictures to be produced by [Disney] . ” (emphasis added). As is apparent from the emphasized portions of the quoted language, the issue is whether, as Bourne contends, the term “motion picture” unambiguously excludes home videocassettes. In support…
, testified regarding the non-celluloid methods of storing motion pictures that were under development during the 1930s. Having concluded that the language of the grant to Disney reasonably is broad enough to cover videocassettes and that the possibility that Disney could market its motion pictures for home viewing was recognized by persons knowledgeable in the entertainment and motion picture industries, we believe that the district court properly submitted to the jury the question of whether the 1933 Shorts Agreement and the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement provided Disney with the right to…
ompositions with videocassettes, Disney had no right to sell or publicly distribute the videocassettes that it produced. Bourne asserts that Disney needed two separate grants from Bourne to make and distribute videocassettes containing the synchronized Compositions: (1) the right to copy (or record) the Compositions in synchronization with Disney’s motion pictures; and (2) a separate right to sell or distribute the videocassettes. Since the grants to Disney do not specifically include the latter right, Bourne argues, Disney’s sale and distribution of its videocassettes constitute an…
panying sounds, if any.”) Accordingly, we agree with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Bloom v. Hearst Entertainment, Inc. , 33 F.3d 518, 525 (5th Cir.1994), in which the court held that “a general grant of motion picture rights is potentially broad enough to contemplate … [videocassettes] as [a] means of distribution.” Insofar as Bourne contends that, because videocassettes were unknown at the time of the agreement, their use could not have been within the contemplation of the parties, we disagree. While the specific technology underlying todays VCR’s was not available during the 1930s, Disney…
f such recordings in connection with the exhibition of the motion pictures with which said recordings were synchronized. The parties agree that this agreement is fully integrated and is not dependent on any prior agreements. d. The 1961 Settlement Agreement In 1957, following the death of Saul Bourne, who was the owner of Bourne, Inc., Disney sued to recapture the copyrights in the Compositions, alleging that the copyrights were held in trust by Bourne on the condition that they would be assigned back to Disney upon demand. In its complaint, Disney described the 1933 Agreement as “relating to…
More questions about this book
- Explain, as if to a non-lawyer, the fundamental disagreement between Bourne and Disney regarding the distribution of music from "Pinocchio" versus "Snow White," highlighting the key legal distinction between the two.
- Trace the chain of ownership and licensing agreements for the musical compositions from their creation in the 1930s up to the point of this 1995 lawsuit. Why did Disney's original assignment of copyright become the central issue?
- What broader implications does this case have for creators and licensees in predicting future technological advancements and the need for precise language in copyright agreements?
- If you were counseling Disney in the 1930s, based on the arguments made in this 1995 case, what specific contractual language would you have insisted upon to protect Disney's rights for future distribution formats, and why would that language be critical?