Synthesized answer
Based solely on the provided passages, the study that "prohibited personal interviews with any of the principal participants" would inevitably lose the insights and perspectives that come from the "memories of people" [2]. Without these memories, the researchers were "certain to make mistakes" because "pieces of paper, formidable and suggestive by themselves, could have meant much or nothing" [2]. For example, a document might never have been sent, or another might have been irrelevant, and without human memory, these nuances are lost [2].
Recognizing these omissions is crucial because the study becomes "not so much a documentary history, as a history based solely on documents" [2]. This approach was "bound to lead to distortions" [1], as the researchers could not "go into the minds of the decision-makers" or know "whether something happened because someone decided it, decided against it, or most likely because it unfolded from the situation" [4]. The passages do not specify exactly which types of perspectives (e.g., personal motivations, off-the-record discussions) are lost, only that the absence of interviews creates a gap that documents alone cannot fill, making a complete…
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
es of people to tell us, we were certain to make mistakes. Yet, using those memories might have been misleading as well. This approach to research was bound to lead to distortions, and distortions we are sure abound in these studies. To bring the documents to life, to fill in gaps, and just to see what the "outside world" was thinking, we turned to newspapers, periodicals, and books. We never used these sources to supplant the classified documents, but only to supplement them. And because these documents, sometimes written by very clever men who knew so much and desired to say only a part and…
d objective." With six full-time professionals assigned to the Task Force, we were to complete our work in three months. A year and a a half later, and with the involvement of six times six professionals, we are finally done to the tune of thirty-seven studies and fifteen collections of documents contained in forty-three volumes. In the beginning, Mr. McNamara gave the Task Force full access to OSD Files , and the Task Force received access to CIA materials, and some use of State Department cables and memoranda. We had no access to White House files. Our guidance prohibited personal…
what seemed to us key documents were reviewed and included in several over-lapping in substance, but separate, studies. The people who worked on the Task Force were superb—uniformly bright and interested, although not always versed in the art of research. We had a sense of doing something important and of the need to do it right. Of course, we all had our prejudices and axes to grind and these shine through clearly at times, but we tried, we think, to suppress or compensate for them. These outstanding people came from everywhere—the military services, State, OSD, and the "think tanks." Some…
ar in the text itself. The monographs themselves stick, by and large, to the documents and do not tend to be analytical. Writing history, especially where it blends into current events, especially where that current event is Vietnam, is a treacherous exercise. We could not go into the minds of the decision-makers, we were not present at the decisions, and we often could not tell whether something happened because someone decided it, decided against it, or most likely because it unfolded from the situation. History, to me, has been expressed by a passage from Herman Melville 's Moby Dick where…
d content can be viewed in the original document: here ( PDF ) . Excerpt from Viet-Nam Witness 1953–1966 by Bernard B. Fall July 1965 – pages 119–120 Non-free text has been removed from this page. The removed content can be viewed in the original document: here ( PDF ) . Excerpt from Toward Peace in Indochina , 1966, by Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon Pages 22–24 Non-free text has been removed from this page. The removed content can be viewed in the original document: here ( PDF ) . Excerpt from The Arrogance of Power , 1966, by Senator J. William Fulbright Pages 111–114 Non-free text has…
More questions about this book
- "Mr. McNamara's guidance was simply to do studies that were 'encyclopedic and objective.'" How might the task force's specific limitations, such as no White House files and prohibited personal interviews, inherently challenge or redefine what constitutes "encyclopedic" and "objective" in this historical account?
- The text describes the result as "not so much a documentary history, as a history based solely on documents." Explain the practical and philosophical difference between these two types of historical writing, and how this distinction shapes the scope and potential biases of the Pentagon Papers.
- The project dramatically expanded from an initial estimate of "six full-time professionals... in three months" to "six times six professionals" over "a year and a half." What does this significant shift suggest about the inherent complexities, political sensitivities, or unforeseen scope of researching US involvement in Vietnam?
- Considering the Pentagon Papers were an internal Department of Defense study that was later leaked and then officially declassified decades later, how does this journey to public knowledge influence its authority, interpretation, and ongoing role in historical and political discourse?