Memoirs 1953–1955

Question

The project dramatically expanded from an initial estimate of "six full-time professionals... in three months" to "six times six professionals" over "a year and a half." What does this significant shift suggest about the inherent complexities, political sensitivities, or unforeseen scope of researching US involvement in Vietnam?

Synthesized answer

The passages indicate that the project expanded from an initial estimate of "six full-time professionals... in three months" to "six times six professionals" over "a year and a half" [1]. This significant shift suggests unforeseen scope and complexity in researching US involvement in Vietnam. The Task Force faced challenges such as limited access to files—"no access to White House files"—and a prohibition on personal interviews with principal participants, forcing reliance solely on documents, which could be "formidable and suggestive by themselves" but potentially misleading [1]. The need to "bring the documents to life" and fill gaps by consulting newspapers, periodicals, and books further indicates that the documentary record alone was insufficient [4].

The passages also reveal political sensitivities and inherent complexities. The researchers had "prejudices and axes to grind," and many were unable to finish their studies due to "the unhappiness of their superiors" [3]. The quality and style of studies varied considerably, and the approach was "bound to lead to distortions" [4]. Writing history that "blends into current events, especially where that current event is Vietnam,"…

Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.

From the book

d objective." With six full-time professionals assigned to the Task Force, we were to complete our work in three months. A year and a a half later, and with the involvement of six times six professionals, we are finally done to the tune of thirty-seven studies and fifteen collections of documents contained in forty-three volumes. In the beginning, Mr. McNamara gave the Task Force full access to OSD Files , and the Task Force received access to CIA materials, and some use of State Department cables and memoranda. We had no access to White House files. Our guidance prohibited personal…
Passage [3]
IV.A, concerning the years 1945 to 1961 tend to be generally non-startling—although there are many interesting tidbits. Because many of the documents in this period were lost or not kept (except for the Geneva Conference era) we had to rely more on outside resources. From 1961 onwards (Parts IV.B and C and VI.C), the records were bountiful, especially on the first Kennedy year in office, the Diem coup , and on the subjects of the deployment of ground forces, the decisions surrounding the bombing campaign against North Vietnam, US–GVN relations, and attempts at negotiating a settlement of the…
Passage [6]
what seemed to us key documents were reviewed and included in several over-lapping in substance, but separate, studies. ​ The people who worked on the Task Force were superb—uniformly bright and interested, although not always versed in the art of research. We had a sense of doing something important and of the need to do it right. Of course, we all had our prejudices and axes to grind and these shine through clearly at times, but we tried, we think, to suppress or compensate for them. These outstanding people came from everywhere—the military services, State, OSD, and the "think tanks." Some…
Passage [5]
es of people to tell us, we were certain to make mistakes. Yet, using those memories might have been misleading as well. This approach to research was bound to lead to distortions, and distortions we are sure abound in these studies. To bring the documents to life, to fill in gaps, and just to see what the "outside world" was thinking, we turned to newspapers, periodicals, and books. We never used these sources to supplant the classified documents, but only to supplement them. And because these documents, sometimes written by very clever men who knew so much and desired to say only a part and…
Passage [4]
ar in the text itself. The monographs themselves stick, by and large, to the documents and do not tend to be analytical. Writing history, especially where it blends into current events, especially where that current event is Vietnam, is a treacherous exercise. We could not go into the minds of the decision-makers, we were not present at the decisions, and we often could not tell whether something happened because someone decided it, decided against it, or most likely because it unfolded from the situation. History, to me, has been expressed by a passage from Herman Melville 's Moby Dick where…
Passage [7]

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