Memoirs 1953–1955

Question

The text describes the result as "not so much a documentary history, as a history based solely on documents." Explain the practical and philosophical difference between these two types of historical writing, and how this distinction shapes the scope and potential biases of the Pentagon Papers.

Synthesized answer

The passages explain that a "documentary history" would typically include personal interviews and context from participants, whereas a "history based solely on documents" relies exclusively on written records without such input. The Task Force was prohibited from personal interviews and had no access to White House files, so they worked only with documents from OSD, CIA, and State Department cables [1]. This approach was chosen because using memories "might have been misleading as well," but it also meant the researchers were "certain to make mistakes" without human context [1][2].

Practically, this distinction shaped the Pentagon Papers by forcing reliance on "pieces of paper" that "could have meant much or nothing" without verification [1]. To compensate, researchers used newspapers and books to supplement documents, but never to supplant them [2]. Philosophically, the authors acknowledge that this method "was bound to lead to distortions" and that the monographs "stick, by and large, to the documents and do not tend to be analytical" [3][4]. The scope was limited to what documents revealed, omitting the "minds of the decision-makers" and the role of chance, free will, and…

Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.

From the book

d objective." With six full-time professionals assigned to the Task Force, we were to complete our work in three months. A year and a a half later, and with the involvement of six times six professionals, we are finally done to the tune of thirty-seven studies and fifteen collections of documents contained in forty-three volumes. In the beginning, Mr. McNamara gave the Task Force full access to OSD Files , and the Task Force received access to CIA materials, and some use of State Department cables and memoranda. We had no access to White House files. Our guidance prohibited personal…
Passage [3]
es of people to tell us, we were certain to make mistakes. Yet, using those memories might have been misleading as well. This approach to research was bound to lead to distortions, and distortions we are sure abound in these studies. To bring the documents to life, to fill in gaps, and just to see what the "outside world" was thinking, we turned to newspapers, periodicals, and books. We never used these sources to supplant the classified documents, but only to supplement them. And because these documents, sometimes written by very clever men who knew so much and desired to say only a part and…
Passage [4]
ar in the text itself. The monographs themselves stick, by and large, to the documents and do not tend to be analytical. Writing history, especially where it blends into current events, especially where that current event is Vietnam, is a treacherous exercise. We could not go into the minds of the decision-makers, we were not present at the decisions, and we often could not tell whether something happened because someone decided it, decided against it, or most likely because it unfolded from the situation. History, to me, has been expressed by a passage from Herman Melville 's Moby Dick where…
Passage [7]
IV.A, concerning the years 1945 to 1961 tend to be generally non-startling—although there are many interesting tidbits. Because many of the documents in this period were lost or not kept (except for the Geneva Conference era) we had to rely more on outside resources. From 1961 onwards (Parts IV.B and C and VI.C), the records were bountiful, especially on the first Kennedy year in office, the Diem coup , and on the subjects of the deployment of ground forces, the decisions surrounding the bombing campaign against North Vietnam, US–GVN relations, and attempts at negotiating a settlement of the…
Passage [6]
what seemed to us key documents were reviewed and included in several over-lapping in substance, but separate, studies. ​ The people who worked on the Task Force were superb—uniformly bright and interested, although not always versed in the art of research. We had a sense of doing something important and of the need to do it right. Of course, we all had our prejudices and axes to grind and these shine through clearly at times, but we tried, we think, to suppress or compensate for them. These outstanding people came from everywhere—the military services, State, OSD, and the "think tanks." Some…
Passage [5]

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