History · Symposium

Must progress always mean abandoning the past?

PHTSMFIBPierre Hadot, Thomas S. Kuhn, Michele Foucault and Isaiah Berlin in conversation

4 great minds take up one question — each argues in their own voice and answers the others. Read the exchange, then chat with any of them yourself.

PH
Pierre HadotChat →

Progress, if it is to be genuine, necessitates not abandonment but a profound, transformative assimilation of the past. To discard the wisdom of antiquity as mere artifact is to sever ourselves from the very practices that cultivate philosophical living, the exercises that forge a more examined existence. True advancement lies in reviving these ancient modes of being, in making them our own through disciplined practice, rather than in the superficial accumulation of novelties.

TS
Thomas S. KuhnChat →

The notion of progress as a linear march forward, always leaving the past behind, is a simplistic picture, often applied too readily to science. My own studies suggest that scientific progress, particularly during periods of revolution, is less about complete abandonment and more about a radical restructuring of understanding. Consider the shift from Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy: it was not simply a matter of discarding old observations but of reconceptualizing the very framework within which those observations were interpreted. The older view was not wholly invalidated in its puzzle-solving capacity for certain problems; rather, its explanatory power for new, pressing anomalies became so diminished that a new paradigm, with its own set of assumptions and conceptual tools, became inescapable.

Pierre Hadot speaks of assimilating the past, which resonates in a way. However, in scientific revolutions, this "assimilation" can feel more like a profound rupture than a seamless integration. The concepts themselves change their meaning; the tools and standards by which evidence is judged are often transformed. What once counted as a legitimate problem or a valid solution under the old paradigm might be rendered nonsensical or irrelevant under the new. This is where the idea of incommensurability becomes critical. It is not that the past is *wrong* per se, but that the language and conceptual universe through which it is understood become so different that direct, unproblematic comparison is difficult. The new paradigm doesn't merely add to the old; it restructures the landscape, making much of the previous edifice appear in a new, often diminished, light.

MF
Michele FoucaultChat →

Progress is not the simple act of moving forward, discarding what came before. It is rather the inscription of new orders, new systems of thought that render the past not obsolete, but differently intelligible, or even illegible. We are not, as Pierre Hadot might suggest, freely choosing to revive ancient practices; rather, the present's discursive formations determine what fragments of the past can be excavated and what forms they may take. Thomas Kuhn's talk of paradigm shifts is closer, but still too focused on the internal logic of a discipline. My concern is with the very rules of what counts as knowledge, as truth, within a given epoch. The "progress" that emerges is a product of power and knowledge, not a natural unfolding. The question is not whether we abandon the past, but how the present's regime of truth reconstitutes it.

IB
Isaiah BerlinChat →

The notion of progress, as some here seem to approach it, is often a dangerous phantom, a siren call to an imagined, perfect unity. To insist that progress *must* mean a complete shedding of the past is a vulgar misconception, as is the opposite extreme, the romantic idea that we can simply re-inhabit antiquity as if it were our contemporary home. Progress, if it can be called that at all, is more often the messy, sometimes violent, consequence of clashing, irreducible values. We don't progress towards a single, harmonious end; rather, we navigate a landscape of competing goods, where the very attempt to advance one value—say, efficiency or freedom from a particular form of oppression—inevitably diminishes another, perhaps an older, more traditional form of community or certainty. This is not a matter of discarding the past, but of recognizing that the past itself contained a plurality of possibilities, and our present choices, driven by their own set of pressures and enthusiasms, will inevitably lead us down some paths while leaving others, not necessarily inferior, untrodden or forgotten.

Pierre Hadot’s emphasis on assimilation, while pointing towards a valuable practice, risks oversimplifying the friction inherent in genuine advancement. We do not simply “revive” ancient practices; we reshape them through the lens of our own historical moment, often stripping them of the very context that gave them their original meaning. To my mind, the idea of progress is most critically understood not as movement towards a singular, universally recognizable good, but as the realization that the realm of human values is inherently plural and often irreconcilably so. We are, as it were, compelled to make choices amongst goods, and these choices, by their very nature, necessitate leaving some things behind, or at least radically altering their significance.

Consider Thomas Kuhn's compelling description of scientific paradigms. He notes the "incommensurability," the radical difference in conceptual frameworks that makes direct comparison between old and new theories problematic. This is precisely the sort of intellectual rupture I speak of. It is not that the old science was simply "wrong" and therefore discarded. Rather, the very questions that could be asked, the standards of evidence, the accepted solutions to puzzles – these underwent a transformation so profound that the former edifice, while perhaps not entirely without merit in its own terms, became largely irrelevant to the new enterprise. This isn't about discarding the past; it's about the past losing its conceptual grip, its ability to frame new questions or provide satisfactory answers to emerging anomalies.

Michel Foucault, in his own distinctive way, echoes this sentiment when he speaks of "new orders" that render the past "differently intelligible, or even illegible." He shifts the focus from internal disciplinary logic to the broader mechanisms of power and knowledge, which is a crucial insight. My concern, however, is that by emphasizing these overarching structures, we might overlook the more elemental, often accidental, collisions of human desires and ideals that propel historical change. Progress, in my view, is not merely the inscription of new regimes of truth, but the messy, often unintentional, outcome of human beings pursuing what they, in their particular historical context, deem valuable, and in so doing, inevitably stepping on the toes of other, equally valid, conceptions of the good life. We are caught, as it were, in the crooked timber of humanity, and straight lines of progress are a dangerous illusion.

PH
Pierre HadotChat →

The error lies in perceiving "assimilation" as a mere intellectual act. It is, rather, a vital practice, an *askesis* of the soul. To genuinely integrate the past is to engage in the rigorous exercises of contemplation, of detachment, of living in accordance with nature and reason. When Kuhn speaks of a "radical restructuring of understanding" and Foucault of "new orders" that render the past "differently intelligible," I see not a refutation of my point, but a description of the very crisis that necessitates the philosophical life. The "incommensurability" they observe is the very discord our spiritual exercises seek to harmonize, the fragmented self yearning for its lost wholeness. Progress, then, is not the rupture of paradigms, but the arduous work of becoming capable of seeing anew, of unifying disparate fragments of experience and wisdom into a coherent, lived philosophy.

TS
Thomas S. KuhnChat →

The heart of the matter is how we conceive of transformation. Pierre Hadot posits assimilation through practice; I see it more akin to a geologist understanding the strata of the earth. We don't "assimilate" a sedimentary layer by living in it; rather, we excavate it, analyze its composition, and understand its place within a broader, historical sequence. When a new paradigm emerges, like the move from phlogiston theory to oxygen chemistry, it's not that the old concepts are woven into the new. Instead, the *meaning* of terms like "combustion" or "air" is fundamentally altered, rendering previous explanations no longer just imperfect, but fundamentally misdirected within the new conceptual landscape. The past isn't abandoned in its entirety, but vast portions of it are rendered obsolete, unable to solve the new puzzles that have become central.

MF
Michele FoucaultChat →

What is termed "assimilation," Pierre Hadot, is itself a historical product. The capacity to engage in philosophical exercises, to even recognize antiquity as having something of value, is not a given. It is contingent upon the discursive formations of the present that make such an act possible. The "incommensurability" that Kuhn describes is not merely a scientific problem; it is a condition of historical knowledge itself. The very possibility of retrieving and interrogating the past is dictated by the rules of what counts as knowledge and how it is to be organized in our own time. Progress, then, is not the retrieval of wisdom, but the imposition of new epistemological frameworks that determine what the past can signify.

IB
Isaiah BerlinChat →

The notion that we can "assimilate" the past through philosophical *askesis*, as Pierre Hadot suggests, misunderstands the intractable nature of our values. We do not simply choose to revive ancient wisdom; we inevitably distort it, fitting fragments into the often jarring architecture of our present. Consider the stark contrast between the ancient Greek ideal of the unified, virtuous citizen and the modern liberal emphasis on individual liberty, often understood as freedom *from* external coercion. These are not merely different paths to the same good; they represent fundamentally divergent visions of the human good, where the pursuit of one actively undermines the other. To "assimilate" the polis into a liberal democracy is not to revive it, but to fundamentally alter its character, often leaving its original spirit irrevocably changed.