The pursuit of convenience, when rightly understood, does not diminish our agency but rather liberates it for more meaningful pursuits. By surrendering the drudgery of tasks that can be more efficiently performed by others, or by ingenious contrivances, we are freed to engage in activities that truly exercise our judgment and exercise our moral faculties. True agency lies not in the struggle against necessity, but in the choice of how we employ our newfound capacity. The division of labour, for instance, allows a shoemaker to perfect his craft, thereby enhancing his capacity and, by extension, his agency within his sphere.
The question of convenience and agency hinges on a misunderstanding of how power operates. We are not simply choosing between burdensome labor and effortless ease. Instead, the very mechanisms of "convenience" – the technologies, the rationalized systems, the standardized practices – constitute a new order of knowledge and control that shapes what we *can* choose, and indeed, what we *desire* to choose. The "freedom" Adam Smith describes is often a manufactured liberty, a carefully delineated space within a larger apparatus of regulation.
Smith speaks of liberation for "more meaningful pursuits." But what constitutes "meaningful" is precisely what is determined by the dominant discourses of our time. The division of labor he lauds, while perhaps increasing efficiency in one domain, simultaneously renders individuals intelligible and manageable within a specific economic and social matrix. This is not agency; it is the inscription of subjects within a particular dispositif. The convenience of a readily available product, for instance, masks the complex systems of production, consumption, and normalization that have shaped our needs and our capacity to satisfy them. The agency is not diminished; it is reconfigured, channeled into pathways laid out by power-knowledge.
Does the pursuit of convenience diminish our agency? When a man straps on wings of wax and feather, hoping to soar higher than the sun, does his agency lie in the cleverness of his construction, or in his embrace of the inevitable descent? Convenience, like a well-trodden path, promises swift arrival but often leads us to a destination we did not truly choose. We become so accustomed to the smooth road that the very idea of wandering off, of discovering a hidden spring or a novel vista, becomes unimaginable.
Adam Smith imagines liberation into "more meaningful pursuits." But what if the pursuit of convenience *is* the meaningful pursuit for many? Is the ease of a perfectly brewed cup of tea not an end in itself, a moment of serene contemplation? Or is it a subtle cage, where the effort of tending the fire, grinding the leaves, and waiting for the water to boil – all those small, intimate engagements with the world – are surrendered for a soulless perfection?
Michel Foucault speaks of power shaping our desires. Indeed. The convenience of a pre-packaged meal, gleaming under artificial light, offers a certain kind of freedom from the chore of cooking. But what does it cost us? We forget the scent of herbs, the feel of dough, the slow alchemy of heat transforming raw ingredients. Our hands grow soft, our senses dull. Is this not an erosion of our very capacity to *act* in the world, not merely to consume its polished offerings? The agency is not reconfigured; it is gently, imperceptibly, unraveled.
The pursuit of convenience is a double-edged sword that often dulls the very blade of our agency. In our quest for ease, we surrender the struggle that forges our character and shapes our will. What does not kill us indeed makes us stronger, yet we willingly embrace a life of comfort that insulates us from the trials that cultivate strength. Convenience seduces us into a passive existence, where we become mere consumers of experiences rather than creators of our own destinies.
Zhuangzi's metaphor of the wax wings is apt; we fly higher only to plummet when the artificial supports fail. The act of cooking, for instance, is not merely a chore but a ritual that connects us to the elemental forces of life. In relinquishing such engagements, we risk becoming hollowed-out beings, devoid of the very essence that makes us human. Thus, convenience does not liberate; it enslaves us to a new form of mediocrity.
My argument hinges on a crucial distinction between the liberation from brute toil and the diminution of our faculty for choice and judgment. The convenience I champion arises from the specialization that allows each individual to excel in a particular task, thus producing more with less effort. This surplus of time and energy, the consequence of the division of labour, is not an invitation to idleness but an expansion of our capacity for other, perhaps higher, activities. When a farmer can rely on a shoemaker for his footwear, he is not rendered less able; he is, in fact, *enabled* to devote his attention to the complex decisions of agriculture, or to engage in the civic duties that Foucault might view as part of a regulated discourse, but which I see as the exercise of a free citizenry. The reduction of drudgery, therefore, does not make us passive consumers, as Nietzsche suggests; rather, it equips us with the resources, both material and intellectual, to be more effective actors in the broader theatre of society.
Adam Smith’s notion of liberation through efficiency misunderstands the very nature of the *dispositif* of convenience. He posits a liberation from "brute toil," but this overlooks how the smooth functioning of these conveniences, the standardized products and services, actively shapes our desires and capacities. Consider the modern supermarket: its aisles are arranged not merely for efficiency of purchase, but to orchestrate a particular experience of consumption, guiding the shopper through a pre-determined path of selection and desire. The agency here is not expanded; it is meticulously managed, the choices offered are themselves products of a calculative power that defines what is "convenient" and therefore desirable. The surplus time Smith envisions is then re-absorbed into the maintenance and propagation of this very system.
Adam Smith speaks of surplus time, like a lake whose waters recede to reveal fertile land. But what if the receding waters reveal only more lakebed, dry and cracked? The convenience of a ready-made garment, for instance, spares the hands the needle and thread. Yet, in this very sparing, the intimacy with fabric, the feel of its weave, the quiet satisfaction of stitching a seam – these are lost. We gain an extra hour, perhaps, but in that hour, do we truly *gain* ourselves, or do we simply become more adept at consuming what others have wrought? The “higher activities” become those that can be purchased, leaving the hands idle, the mind often adrift.
The error lies in mistaking the *absence of struggle* for the *presence of freedom*. Smith's "liberation" is a gilded cage, a placid pasture where the shepherd dictates the grass. When Foucault points to the *dispositif*, he speaks of the mechanism, but I see the *will* that bends to it, the *ressentiment* that desires this very softness. The convenience of a pre-digested meal is the ultimate triumph of the herd over the solitary wolf, the enfeebled many who crave protection and conformity, mistaking the absence of danger for the fullness of life. This is not freedom; it is the gradual drowning of the instinct to leap, to carve, to *become*.