Synthesized answer
Bridgman's statement suggests that intellectual influence operates through assimilation rather than direct, recent engagement with source material. Ideas that are "assimilated" have become deeply integrated into one's thinking, to the point where their precise origin might be forgotten [1]. This process indicates that scientific thought evolves by internalizing and re-articulating existing knowledge, rather than solely through ongoing, explicit reading and referencing of past works.
The passage explains that ideas "gain in plausibility through having been found acceptable to independent thought" because this implies that the idea has been tested and validated by different minds without direct prompting from its original proponent [1]. This independent acceptance suggests robustness and universal applicability, making the idea more convincing. The passages do not further elaborate on the specific mechanisms or implications of this phenomenon beyond the gained plausibility.
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
siological origin of our concepts of space, time, and mechanics with which the previous essays were largely concerned. None of the previous essays have consciously or immediately affected the details of this; in fact I have not read any of them within several years. If passages here recall passages already written, it is because the ideas have been assimilated and the precise origin forgotten; it is probably worth while to let such passages stand without revision, because such ideas gain in plausibility through having been found acceptable to independent thought. I am much indebted to…
Stallo, Mach, and Poincaré, to mention only a few, I believe a new essay of this critical character needs no apology. For entirely apart from the question of whether many of the points of view of these essays can be maintained, the discovery of new facts in the domain of relativity and quantum theory has shifted the center of interest and emphasis. All the quite recent activity with the new quantum mechanics seems to call for a new examination of fundamental matters which shall recognize, at least by implication, the existence of the special phenomena of the quantum domain. However,…
the new ideas prefaced by analysis of what experiment really gives to us or what our fundamental concepts really mean. The change in ideas is now so rapid that a number of the statements of this essay are already antiquated as expressions of the best current opinion; however I have allowed these statements to stand, since the fundamental arguments are in nowise affected and we have no reason to think that present best opinions are in any way final. We have the impression of being in an important formative period; if we are, the complexion of physics for a long time in the future will…
nto new and unfamiliar realms, we are to be at least prepared for a new crisis. Now what are we to do in such a crisis? It seems to me that the only sensible course is to do exactly what the kitten does, namely, to wait until we have amassed so much experience of the new kind that it is perfectly familiar to us, and then to resume the process of explanation with elements from our new experience included in our list of axioms. Not only will observation show that this is what is now actually being done with respect to quantum and gravitational phenomena, but it is in harmony with the…
thy movements in recent physics is a change of attitude toward what may be called the interpretative aspect of physics. It is being increasingly recognized, both in the writings and the conversation of physicists, that the world of experiment is not understandable without some examination of the purpose of physics and of the nature of its fundamental concepts. It is no new thing to attempt a more critical understanding of the nature of physics, but until recently all such attempts have been regarded with a certain suspicion or even sometimes contempt. The average physicist is likely to…
More questions about this book
- How does P.W. Bridgman's background as an experimental physicist, rather than a philosopher, uniquely shape his motivation and approach to examining the "foundations of our physical thought" in 1927?
- Bridgman argues that new discoveries in "relativity and quantum theory" necessitated a re-examination of fundamental matters. Explain in your own words how these specific scientific advancements might have fundamentally challenged or shifted the philosophical underpinnings of physics, making older critiques insufficient.
- Bridgman acknowledges previous critical essays but states his new essay "needs no apology." How does he reconcile the enduring validity of some past critical results (which are "thoroughly incorporated into physical thinking") with the imperative for a new examination prompted by modern discoveries?
- The "fundamental attitude of this essay is empiricism." Based on the text, how does Bridgman justify empiricism as the appropriate stance for a physicist, particularly in relation to the "physiological origin of our concepts of space, time, and mechanics"?