Synthesized answer
Bridgman justifies empiricism as the appropriate stance for a physicist because it is largely supported by inquiries into the "physiological origin of our concepts of space, time, and mechanics" [1]. This approach, which was a focus of previous essays, suggests that our fundamental physical concepts are rooted in our sensory and operational experiences.
Empiricism, as described in the text, means that physical concepts are defined by the "operations to which a physical concept are equivalent" [3]. These operations are "actual physical operations" [3]. Therefore, concepts are only defined within the range of actual experiment and are meaningless in regions not yet explored by experiment [3]. This also implies that our understanding of these concepts is tied to what we can physically do and measure, and we must be prepared to find that our concepts "correspond to nothing or only partially correspond" to nature [5].
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
Stallo, Mach, and Poincaré, to mention only a few, I believe a new essay of this critical character needs no apology. For entirely apart from the question of whether many of the points of view of these essays can be maintained, the discovery of new facts in the domain of relativity and quantum theory has shifted the center of interest and emphasis. All the quite recent activity with the new quantum mechanics seems to call for a new examination of fundamental matters which shall recognize, at least by implication, the existence of the special phenomena of the quantum domain. However,…
siological origin of our concepts of space, time, and mechanics with which the previous essays were largely concerned. None of the previous essays have consciously or immediately affected the details of this; in fact I have not read any of them within several years. If passages here recall passages already written, it is because the ideas have been assimilated and the precise origin forgotten; it is probably worth while to let such passages stand without revision, because such ideas gain in plausibility through having been found acceptable to independent thought. I am much indebted to…
and we need never be embarrassed, as we were in attempting to find in nature the prototype of Newton's absolute time. Furthermore, if we remember that the operations to which a physical concept are equivalent are actual physical operations, the concepts can be defined only in the range of actual experiment, and are undefined and meaningless in regions as yet untouched by experiment. It follows that strictly speaking we cannot make statements at all about regions as yet untouched, and that when we do make such statements, as we inevitably shall, we are making a conventionalized…
correlations and experiments, but a recognition of the empirical basis of all physics will not allow us to go further. MODELS AND CONSTRUCTS In discussing the concept of length, we could find no meaning in questions such as: "Is space on a scale of 10^-8 cm. Euclidean?" Nevertheless it will seem to many that they do attach a perfectly definite meaning to a question of this kind. Of course it must be agreed that magnitudes of 10^-8 cm. cannot be thought of in terms of immediate sensation. When one thinks of an atom as a thing with any geometrical properties at all, I believe he…
n nature, and we must always be prepared to find that the concepts correspond to nothing or only partially correspond. In particular, if we examine the definition of absolute time in the light of experiment, we find nothing in nature with such properties. The new attitude toward a concept is entirely different. We may illustrate by considering the concept of length: what do we mean by the length of an object? We evidently know what we mean by length if we can tell what the length of any and every object is, and for the physicist nothing more is required. To find the length of an…
More questions about this book
- How does P.W. Bridgman's background as an experimental physicist, rather than a philosopher, uniquely shape his motivation and approach to examining the "foundations of our physical thought" in 1927?
- Bridgman argues that new discoveries in "relativity and quantum theory" necessitated a re-examination of fundamental matters. Explain in your own words how these specific scientific advancements might have fundamentally challenged or shifted the philosophical underpinnings of physics, making older critiques insufficient.
- Bridgman acknowledges previous critical essays but states his new essay "needs no apology." How does he reconcile the enduring validity of some past critical results (which are "thoroughly incorporated into physical thinking") with the imperative for a new examination prompted by modern discoveries?
- What does Bridgman's statement about assimilated ideas, rather than recent reading, reveal about the process of intellectual influence and the evolution of scientific thought? Why would ideas "gain in plausibility" by being independently found acceptable?