Synthesized answer
Based solely on the provided passages, the US decision to delay revealing its evidence reveals two strategic objectives and an assessment of Soviet trustworthiness.
First, the delay was intended to expose Soviet deceit to the world. Stevenson states the US was "assembling the evidence" to see "how far he would go in perfidy" [1], suggesting a strategic goal of publicly demonstrating Soviet dishonesty. This was linked to a prior instance of "nuclear deceit" when the USSR broke the nuclear test moratorium [1], showing the US assessed the Soviets as untrustworthy based on past behavior.
Second, the delay allowed the US to assess Soviet intentions during the crisis. By waiting, the US could observe if the Soviet Union would continue to lie, as Stevenson notes Zorin "deliberately, cynically deceived us" [1]. The passages show the US expected this deception, as Stevenson later says "I knew it would be" when Zorin failed to answer directly [4]. This reveals a US assessment that the Soviet Union was not acting in good faith, and that exposing this was a strategic objective in itself. The passages do not, however, detail any other strategic objectives beyond exposing perfidy and testing…
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
t Mr. Gromyko was blandly denying to the President that the U.S.S.R. was placing such weapons on sites in the new world. Well, I will tell you why—because we were assembling the evidence, and perhaps it would be instructive to the world to see how a Soviet official—how far he would go in perfidy. Perhaps we wanted to know if this country faced another example of nuclear deceit like that one a year ago, when in stealth, the Soviet Union broke the nuclear test moratorium. And while we are asking questions, let me ask you why your Government—your Foreign Minister—deliberately, cynically deceived…
sador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no—don't wait for the translation—yes or no? (The Soviet representative waited for translation, then responded.) "This is not a court of law, I do not need to provide a yes or no answer..." (was cut off by Mr. Stevenson at this point) *Source United Nations Assembly video archives. You can answer yes or no. You have denied they exist. I want to know if I understood you correctly. I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision.…
which we have illustrated only a fragment—are a part of a much larger weapons complex, what is called a weapons system. To support this build-up, to operate these advanced weapons systems, the Soviet Union has sent a large number of military personnel to Cuba—a force now amounting to several thousand men. These photographs, as I say, are available to members for detailed examination in the Trusteeship Council room following this meeting. There I will have one of my aides who will gladly explain them to you in such detail as you may require. I have nothing further to say at this time. (After…
s in Cuba—and that question remains unanswered. I knew it would be. As to the authenticity of the photographs, which Mr. Zorin has spoken about with such scorn, I wonder if the Soviet Union would ask its Cuban colleague to permit a U.N. team to go to these sites. If so, I can assure you that we can direct them to the proper places very quickly. And now I hope that we can get down to business, that we can stop this sparring. We know the facts, and so do you, sir, and we are ready to talk about them. Our job here is not to score debating points. Our job, Mr. Zorin, is to save the peace. And if…
← Cuban Missile Crisis speech to the United Nations Security Council ( 1962 ) by Adlai Stevenson → information about this edition related portals : Speeches US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson addresses the UN Security Council and his Soviet counterpart Valerian Zorin on 25 October 1962 68468 Cuban Missile Crisis speech to the United Nations Security Council 1962 Adlai Stevenson I want to say to you, Mr. Zorin, that I do not have your talent for obfuscation, for distortion, for confusing language, and for doubletalk. And I must confess to you that I am glad that I do not! But if I understood what…
More questions about this book
- Explain Stevenson's core argument against the Soviet Union's actions and rhetoric in Cuba. How does he use the contrast between his communication style and Zorin's to bolster his credibility and message?
- Stevenson repeatedly claims the US possesses "clear and incontrovertible" evidence of missiles in Cuba. If you were tasked with explaining the significance of this evidence to someone unfamiliar with the crisis, what aspects would you emphasize, and why would it compel immediate action?
- Stevenson highlights the shifting Soviet positions on the missiles, from calling them "defensive weapons" to denying their existence entirely. How does he strategically use these inconsistencies to undermine the Soviet Union's credibility and strengthen his own accusations of "perfidy"?
- Stevenson asserts that the Soviet Union "has upset the balance of power in the world." How would you explain the concept of the "balance of power" in the context of the Cold War to a layperson, and why was the placement of missiles in Cuba considered such a profound disruption to it?