Summary
In this 1962 speech to the UN Security Council, U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson directly confronts Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin over the placement of Soviet medium- and intermediate-range missiles in Cuba. Stevenson’s central argument is that the Soviet Union has secretly installed offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba, upsetting the global balance of power, and that these weapons must be removed. He repeatedly demands a simple yes-or-no answer from Zorin on whether the missiles exist, stating he is “prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over.” Stevenson presents photographic evidence of missile sites and a weapons system, including launch sites and military personnel, as incontrovertible proof. He rejects Zorin’s claims of U.S. pressure from world opinion, insisting the only change in the U.S. position is a willingness to discuss UN proposals. The speech culminates in Stevenson’s declaration that the UN’s job is “to save the peace,” not to score debating points. A reader takes away a vivid example of Cold War confrontation, where direct evidence and public demand for accountability are used to counter Soviet denials.
Key concepts
- Incontrovertible evidence — Photographic proof of missile sites that Stevenson presents as clear and undeniable, contrasting with Soviet denials.
- Balance of power — The global military equilibrium that Stevenson argues the Soviet Union has upset by placing missiles in Cuba.
- Yes-or-no demand — Stevenson’s repeated, direct request for Zorin to confirm or deny the presence of missiles, refusing to accept evasion.
- Weapons system — The complex of missile launch sites, support facilities, and military personnel that Stevenson identifies as part of a larger Soviet build-up in Cuba.
- Sparring — Stevenson’s term for the verbal back-and-forth he seeks to end, urging the UN to focus on substantive peace-saving action.
- U Thant's proposals — UN Secretary-General U Thant’s suggested diplomatic measures that Stevenson indicates the U.S. is willing to discuss.
From the book
Title: Speech to the United Nations (1960) by Nikita Khrushchev← Cuban Missile Crisis speech to the United Nations Security Council ( 1962 ) by Adlai Stevenson → information about this edition related portals : Speeches US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson addresses the UN Security Council and his Soviet counterpart Valerian Zorin on 25 October 1962 68468 Cuban Missile Crisis speech to the United Nations Security Council 1962 Adlai Stevenson I want to say to you, Mr. Zorin, that I do not have your talent for obfuscation, for distortion, for confusing language, and for doubletalk. And I must confess to you that I am glad that I do not! But if I understood what you said, you said that my position had changed, that today I was defensive because we did not have the evidence to prove our assertions,…
Popular questions readers ask
- Explain Stevenson's core argument against the Soviet Union's actions and rhetoric in Cuba. How does he use the contrast between his communication style and Zorin's to bolster his credibility and message?
- Stevenson repeatedly claims the US possesses "clear and incontrovertible" evidence of missiles in Cuba. If you were tasked with explaining the significance of this evidence to someone unfamiliar with the crisis, what aspects would you emphasize, and why would it compel immediate action?
- Stevenson highlights the shifting Soviet positions on the missiles, from calling them "defensive weapons" to denying their existence entirely. How does he strategically use these inconsistencies to undermine the Soviet Union's credibility and strengthen his own accusations of "perfidy"?
- Stevenson asserts that the Soviet Union "has upset the balance of power in the world." How would you explain the concept of the "balance of power" in the context of the Cold War to a layperson, and why was the placement of missiles in Cuba considered such a profound disruption to it?
- Stevenson explains the US delayed revealing its evidence to observe "how far he would go in perfidy." Beyond simply gathering more proof, what does this decision reveal about the US's strategic objectives and their assessment of Soviet trustworthiness and intentions during the crisis?