Synthesized answer
Interpretive blindness (IB) arises from a co-dependence between background beliefs and interpretation, specifically regarding the reliability of evidence [2, 5]. This co-dependence means that an agent's existing beliefs influence how they interpret new information [3, 5]. When combined with the nature of contemporary testimony, which can be "argumentatively complete," this prevents belief updating. Argumentatively complete testimony is characterized by authors who can address and refute any doubts or counterarguments that might challenge their credibility [1].
This argumentative completeness allows testimony to undermine higher-order constraints and good epistemic practices essential for learning [1]. A skillful presenter of argumentatively complete testimony can always find a way to dismiss or undercut opposing data or arguments, regardless of their quality [1]. Consequently, agents prone to interpretive blindness will discount evidence that contradicts their beliefs because their interpretation is already shaped by those beliefs, creating a mutually reinforcing cycle [1, 3]. The passages explain how this co-dependence and argumentative completeness contribute to IB, but they do…
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
ion to few sources of testimony and a natural co-dependence between beliefs and interpretation (Asher and Paul, 2018 ) . Relying on testimony from a restricted set of sources to update one’s beliefs leads to the mutual reinforcement of our confidence in the source and our belief in ; this creates a bias that can preclude learning when an agent tries to exploit new data that are incompatible with or simply distinct from . Agents who are interpretively blind will discount any evidence that challenges their beliefs. We use Wolpert’s 2018 extended Bayesian framework to prove our results. While IB…
can respond to and argue with any doubts raised by other data or arguments in a body that might threaten ’s credibility. A skillful climate denier, for example, will always find a way to undercut the most scientifically careful argument. Argumentatively complete testimony thus can undermine higher order constraints and good epistemic practices that should guide first order learning. Our paper starts in Section LABEL:sec:testimony by discussing testimony. We then introduce the codependence of belief and interpretation and apply it to the situation of testimony and the sources that support it.…
n learning because of a co-dependence between beliefs and the interpretation of evidence, in particular its reliability. In this case, we are talking of the interpretation of written or linguistically conveyed information. Others have already noted a co-dependence of beliefs and linguistic interpretation (Asher and Paul, 2018 ) . Consider this exchange. R: “Why hasn’t the senator commented on the story that he received undisclosed gifts from supporters?” A: “The Senator has declared every gift that he has received.” As Asher and Paul ( 2018 ) argue, one could interpret A’s response either as…
Interpretive Blindness Nicholas Asher 1 1 1 CNRS, IRIT and Julie Hunter 2 2 2 Linagora GSO Abstract We model here an epistemic bias we call interpretive blindness (IB). IB is a special problem for learning from testimony, in which one acquires information only from text or conversation. We show that IB follows from a co-dependence between background beliefs and interpretation in a Bayesian setting and the nature of contemporary testimony. We argue that a particular characteristic contemporary testimony, argumentative completeness , can preclude learning in hierarchical Bayesian settings, even…
y testimony leads agents naturally to a situation where IB occurs. How general are the results in Propositions 6 and 7 ? Wolpert ( 2018 ) argues that PAC, Statistical Physics Framework, VC, and supervised Bayesian learning are four different instantiations of his extended Bayesian formalism, which we use. Thus our results should hold for other frameworks. 5 Comparisons to Prior Work IB is an epistemological bias that is clearly related to confirmation bias (Lord et al . , 1979 ; Nickerson, 1998 ; Oswald and Grosjean, 2004 ) , in which agents interpret new evidence in a way that confirms their…
More questions about this book
- How would you explain "interpretive blindness" and its primary causes to someone completely unfamiliar with the term, without using any jargon from the text? What simple analogy could you use to illustrate its effect on learning?
- How does "argumentative completeness," as described, differ from simpler forms of bias like confirmation bias or selective exposure? Why is this distinction crucial for understanding its impact on learning within both standard and hierarchical Bayesian frameworks?
- The authors claim that argumentative completeness can preclude learning "even in the presence of constraints that are designed to promote good epistemic practices." What specific "good epistemic practices" might they be referring to, and why do they prove insufficient against interpretive blindness when testimony is argumentatively complete?
- Given that interpretive blindness stems from relying on a restricted set of testimony sources, what practical strategies could an individual or a society employ to actively combat this bias in a modern information landscape dominated by social media and specialized interest groups?