Synthesized answer
The passages suggest that argumentatively complete testimony can preclude learning by incorporating an "adversarial attack mechanism against any good epistemic practices" [3]. While the passages don't explicitly list specific "good epistemic practices," they imply that these practices should guide first-order learning [4] and might involve evaluating the credibility of testimony [1, 4]. These practices are insufficient because argumentatively complete testimony ensures its authors can respond to and argue against any doubts raised by other data or arguments that might threaten its credibility [1, 4].
This creates a situation where an agent may hold onto an argumentatively complete theory regardless of its inadequacy by external standards, as it will always find a reply to any attack or doubt it acquires [2]. This mechanism guarantees interpretive blindness (IB) [3]. The passages indicate that argumentatively complete testimony can undermine higher-order constraints and good epistemic practices that should guide first-order learning [4].
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
ion to few sources of testimony and a natural co-dependence between beliefs and interpretation (Asher and Paul, 2018 ) . Relying on testimony from a restricted set of sources to update one’s beliefs leads to the mutual reinforcement of our confidence in the source and our belief in ; this creates a bias that can preclude learning when an agent tries to exploit new data that are incompatible with or simply distinct from . Agents who are interpretively blind will discount any evidence that challenges their beliefs. We use Wolpert’s 2018 extended Bayesian framework to prove our results. While IB…
ypotheses are rational and are updated on . If such confirms a hypothesis that does not, then is incapable of learning . Claim 2 of Proposition 6 shows that . Then apply Proposition 4 . Argumentatively complete testimony thus collapses the case of higher order Bayesian frameworks to our first order setting. What is troubling about IB is that our learner may hold onto an argumentatively complete regardless of how inadequate it is in the eyes of others or standard epistemic criteria; an argumentatively complete theory will always eventually find a reply to any attack or any doubt might acquire.…
e difference between training error and test error)—do not necessarily lead to good generalization and test performance. Argumentatively complete testimony incorporates an adversarial attack mechanism against any good epistemic practices that might discount . It’s this mechanism that guarantees IB. The argumentation literature (Amgoud and Demolombe, 2014 ; Dung, 1995 ) is also relevant to IB. If testimony is argumentatively complete , then always provides a counterargument to an attack against –much like an acceptable argument in Dung ( 1995 ) . In addition, however, an argumentatively…
can respond to and argue with any doubts raised by other data or arguments in a body that might threaten ’s credibility. A skillful climate denier, for example, will always find a way to undercut the most scientifically careful argument. Argumentatively complete testimony thus can undermine higher order constraints and good epistemic practices that should guide first order learning. Our paper starts in Section LABEL:sec:testimony by discussing testimony. We then introduce the codependence of belief and interpretation and apply it to the situation of testimony and the sources that support it.…
e those promoting QAnon will attack arguments against their theories once they become aware of them. 3 3 3 See Stuart A. Thompson, “Three Weeks Inside a Pro-Trump QAnon Chat Room” NY Times , Jan 26, 2021). In anecdotal support of our claims, consider Michelle Goldberg’s “It’s Marjorie Taylor Greene’s Party Now” New York Times , 2/2/2021) description of a group in IB: “American conservatism — particularly its evangelical strain — has fostered derangement in its ranks for decades, insisting that no source of information outside its own self-reinforcing ideological bubble is trustworthy.” A…
More questions about this book
- How would you explain "interpretive blindness" and its primary causes to someone completely unfamiliar with the term, without using any jargon from the text? What simple analogy could you use to illustrate its effect on learning?
- The text states that interpretive blindness "follows from a co-dependence between background beliefs and interpretation... and the nature of contemporary testimony." Elaborate on *how* this co-dependence and the specific characteristic of contemporary testimony (argumentative completeness) interact to prevent an agent from updating their beliefs, even when presented with new, incompatible data.
- How does "argumentative completeness," as described, differ from simpler forms of bias like confirmation bias or selective exposure? Why is this distinction crucial for understanding its impact on learning within both standard and hierarchical Bayesian frameworks?
- Given that interpretive blindness stems from relying on a restricted set of testimony sources, what practical strategies could an individual or a society employ to actively combat this bias in a modern information landscape dominated by social media and specialized interest groups?