Synthesized answer
Gain-of-function research, as described in the passages, involves experiments that enhance the transmissibility and pathogenicity of a virus [3]. Specifically, the MPXV experiment in question appeared to qualify as gain-of-function research of concern (GOFROC) because it planned to increase the transmissibility and pathogenicity of clade II MPXV by inserting genes from clade I MPXV [3].
The ethical and biosecurity dilemmas stem from the potential creation of a more dangerous virus. Specifically, transferring genes from the more lethal clade I MPXV into the more transmissible clade II MPXV could result in a chimeric virus with increased transmissibility and high lethality [3, 5]. This raises concerns about sparking an epidemic that would be substantially more lethal [3]. The passages do not explicitly define "ethical and biosecurity dilemmas" beyond the implications of creating a more dangerous pathogen and its potential for misuse or accidental release.
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
search Involving Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens (collectively hereinafter referred to as “P3CO”) imposed in 2017. The new OSTP policy continues to give funding agencies, like NIAID, primary responsibility for oversight of GOFROC and DURC experiments involving potentially dangerous pathogens. Under both the 2017 policy and the new 2024 policy, for the vast majority of experiments involving potentially dangerous pathogens—like MPXV, the agency conducting the experiment is also tasked with regulating and overseeing the experiment. In almost any other scientific field or industry, this…
on. The biological weapons potential of MPXV and other orthopoxviruses has only increased since the end of the Cold War. On March 26, 2024, the National Academies of Science, Medicine, and Engineering issued a consensus study report that noted the future risk posed by the proliferation of synthetic biology and gene editing technology: While construction of orthopoxvirus from scratch is now possible, the committee estimated that the number of labs capable of carrying out such work is limited to perhaps less than 100 globally. The committee expects this number to increase over the next two…
minent pox virologist who has worked for decades at NIAID and is a NIH Distinguished Investigator. In the interview, Dr. Moss noted he and his colleagues had swapped dozens of genes from the much more transmissible, but less deadly, clade II MPXV into the more deadly clade I MPXV. The article stated that the Moss team was “planning to try the opposite, endowing clade II virus with genes from its deadlier relative.” The proposal to transfer genes from the deadlier clade I into the more transmissible clade II alarmed some scientists who believed a more potent version of the mpox outbreak…
s from the less virulent clade IIa to see if he could diminish the virulence of the more severe virus in a rodent model. This is the most cautious approach, trying to attenuate the virulent strain, and this was the approach that Dr. Moss has taken. He has not at any point pursued transferring genes from the more virulent strain (clade I) into the less virulent strain (clade II), nor has he made specific plans to do so. If the latter strategy were to be pursued in the future, it would be preceded extensive consultation and rigorous evaluation and review by the committees that Jeff Potts will…
e planning to try the opposite, endowing clade 2 virus with genes from its deadlier relative. [Bold added for emphasis]. As Members of the committee of jurisdiction responsible for the NIH and federal biomedical research, Republican Committee Leaders wrote to HHS to understand better the scope and potential risk of the proposed gene transfer experiment. As described above in the Science article, the experiment could result in a chimeric virus with the increased transmissibility of clade II viruses while retaining the high levels of lethality found in the clade I virus. If the experiment…
More questions about this book
- How would you explain, in simple terms, *why* transferring genes from a more deadly virus clade into a more transmissible clade raises such significant alarm among scientists and warrants a Congressional investigation? Focus on the practical implications if such a modified virus were to escape a lab.
- The Committee on Energy and Commerce has jurisdiction over public health agencies and a history of investigating risky research. Explain the *tension* that might exist between scientific autonomy (researchers like Dr. Moss) and governmental oversight (E&C Committee) when dealing with experiments that could have severe public health consequences.
- Imagine you are an independent expert tasked with evaluating Dr. Moss's proposal. Based on the information provided, what critical questions would you demand be answered, and what specific biosafety and biosecurity measures would you require *before* considering approval for this experiment? Justify your requirements.
- What broader lessons about balancing scientific advancement with public safety and biosecurity can be drawn from the details of this investigation? How might such incidents influence public trust in scientific institutions and regulatory bodies responsible for oversight?