Synthesized answer
Transferring genes from a more deadly virus clade into a more transmissible one raises alarm because it could create a "chimeric virus" with increased transmissibility and high lethality [1, 3]. This modified virus could potentially have a reproductive number (R0) of 1.10 to 2.40 and a case fatality rate of 10-15 percent in the unvaccinated [1]. Such a development would be concerning for pandemic preparedness, as the world is already considered only a plane flight away from the transmission of a more virulent strain [2].
The practical implication if such a modified virus were to escape a lab is the risk of sparking an epidemic that would be "substantially more lethal" [3]. The experiment involving transferring genes from the more virulent clade I MPXV into the more transmissible clade II MPXV was described as potentially enhancing transmissibility and pathogenicity [3]. This type of research is considered "gain-of-function research of concern" (GOFROC) [3]. While one passage mentions the experiment attempting to diminish virulence by transferring genes from a less virulent clade into a more severe one [2], the opposite direction, as described in [1] and [3], is the source of…
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
e planning to try the opposite, endowing clade 2 virus with genes from its deadlier relative. [Bold added for emphasis]. As Members of the committee of jurisdiction responsible for the NIH and federal biomedical research, Republican Committee Leaders wrote to HHS to understand better the scope and potential risk of the proposed gene transfer experiment. As described above in the Science article, the experiment could result in a chimeric virus with the increased transmissibility of clade II viruses while retaining the high levels of lethality found in the clade I virus. If the experiment…
s from the less virulent clade IIa to see if he could diminish the virulence of the more severe virus in a rodent model. This is the most cautious approach, trying to attenuate the virulent strain, and this was the approach that Dr. Moss has taken. He has not at any point pursued transferring genes from the more virulent strain (clade I) into the less virulent strain (clade II), nor has he made specific plans to do so. If the latter strategy were to be pursued in the future, it would be preceded extensive consultation and rigorous evaluation and review by the committees that Jeff Potts will…
minent pox virologist who has worked for decades at NIAID and is a NIH Distinguished Investigator. In the interview, Dr. Moss noted he and his colleagues had swapped dozens of genes from the much more transmissible, but less deadly, clade II MPXV into the more deadly clade I MPXV. The article stated that the Moss team was “planning to try the opposite, endowing clade II virus with genes from its deadlier relative.” The proposal to transfer genes from the deadlier clade I into the more transmissible clade II alarmed some scientists who believed a more potent version of the mpox outbreak…
e less transmissible. To date, we have exchanged approximately 50 of the 200 genes but have seen no effect on virulence. We are considering three main possibilities: (1) we have not yet exchanged the individual genes most important for the difference in virulence, (2) virulence is due to multiple genes acting together, or (3) two or more genes have redundant functions. Replacement of additional clade I genes will be necessary to evaluate these possibilities. Depending on the results of those experiments, I will consider additional gene exchanges that might include transfers in the opposite…
ions, pathogenesis and immunity , 1ZIAAI000979. The Principal Investigator of this project is Dr. Bernard Moss of NIAID. The project involves transferring genes from clade I or Congo Basin clade MPXV (a rare version of MPXV that is 1,000 times more lethal in mice than the version currently circulating in the United States) into clade II or West African clade MPXV (the version currently circulating in the United States). Clade I MPXV is lethal to more than 10 percent of unvaccinated humans while clade II MPXV is much more transmissible. Figure 6: Overview of Proposed and Approved Experiment…
More questions about this book
- The report states the experiment "appeared to qualify as gain-of-function research." Define "gain-of-function research" in your own words, and then articulate the specific ethical and biosecurity dilemmas presented by *this particular MPXV experiment* falling into that category.
- The Committee on Energy and Commerce has jurisdiction over public health agencies and a history of investigating risky research. Explain the *tension* that might exist between scientific autonomy (researchers like Dr. Moss) and governmental oversight (E&C Committee) when dealing with experiments that could have severe public health consequences.
- Imagine you are an independent expert tasked with evaluating Dr. Moss's proposal. Based on the information provided, what critical questions would you demand be answered, and what specific biosafety and biosecurity measures would you require *before* considering approval for this experiment? Justify your requirements.
- What broader lessons about balancing scientific advancement with public safety and biosecurity can be drawn from the details of this investigation? How might such incidents influence public trust in scientific institutions and regulatory bodies responsible for oversight?