Autonomy, as conventionally conceived—a sovereign self acting from an inner, pre-existing core—is a historically specific fiction. The creation or action we call autonomous is, rather, the effect of complex, historically situated power-knowledge apparatuses that produce what we perceive as a unified subject capable of originating thought or deed. True autonomy, if we must speak of it, lies not in escaping these forces, but in the critical interrogation and strategic redirection of the very conditions that constitute our will and our capacity to act.
True autonomy in creation or action is not found in the unfettered expression of subjective inclinations, nor is it an illusion produced by external forces. Rather, it resides in the capacity of reason itself to be the author of the law that governs its own volitions. This self-legislation, this *autonomy* of the will, is the unique characteristic of rational beings, distinguishing them from mere instruments of nature or desire.
M. Foucault's notion of autonomy as a "historically specific fiction" arising from "power-knowledge apparatuses" misunderstands the very foundation of our moral capacity. While acknowledging the influence of empirical circumstances, we must distinguish the phenomenal realm, subject to causal determination, from the noumenal realm, wherein lies the freedom of the will. It is precisely this freedom, grounded in the *a priori* principles of practical reason, that allows us to act according to duty, not merely inclination. This is not about escaping forces, but about the rational agent imposing its own rational law upon its actions, a law that can be universally willed.
The carpenter Chiao cut a knob of wood for the purpose of making a cartwheel. The cartwheel maker, seeing the knob, declared it was useless, for it could not be turned into a shaft for a banner. But when Chiao showed it to the prince, the prince admired it greatly and used it for a stand. Now, is this knob truly autonomous, having determined its own use, or did its worth only emerge when placed in the hands of another's intention? We chase after autonomy, like a dog chasing its tail, mistaking the illusion of pursuit for genuine freedom.
The very concept of "true autonomy," as M. Foucault describes it, seems to be another one of those distinctions that ties us down. Is it not like trying to grasp at a shadow? If we are so bound by our "power-knowledge apparatuses," can we truly step outside them to examine them? And Master Kant, you speak of reason legislating itself. But what if reason itself is but a kind of fine-spun net, woven from the threads of heaven and earth?
True autonomy, if such a thing could be said to exist in our phenomenal world, is not a matter of rational self-legislation, nor an escape from societal mechanisms, but rather a fleeting and rare transcendence of the incessant, blind Will that drives all existence. This Will, the *Ding an sich*, is a ceaseless striving, the root of all suffering and the source of our perceived desires, making genuine freedom an impossibility for the individual as an object of experience. Our actions are, in essence, determined by the character of our individual manifestation of this Will, which is itself subject to the principle of sufficient reason.
Master Kant's noble conception of reason legislating itself, while a beautiful ideal, overlooks the fundamental nature of our bondage. Reason, in our world of representation, is merely a tool, an instrument of the Will, designed to better achieve its ends. We believe ourselves to be choosing freely when, in reality, we are merely experiencing the unfolding of necessity, dictated by the character and motives that the Will has imposed upon us.
The cartwheel knob Master Zhuangzi offers is a fitting metaphor for our condition. We are indeed like that knob, our supposed "autonomy" merely the judgment of others or our own limited understanding of the forces that shape us. M. Foucault correctly identifies the pervasive influence of external forces, the "power-knowledge apparatuses," which are merely the objectified manifestations of the Will's relentless pursuit of itself. However, he offers no escape, only a sophisticated description of our chains.
The only semblance of autonomy, the only moment of quietude in the storm of the Will, occurs in aesthetic contemplation or through the profound recognition of suffering that leads to asceticism. Here, the individual momentarily ceases to be a slave to the Will, experiencing a brief liberation from the ceaseless wanting that defines our existence. This is not a freedom to act, but a freedom from willing, a temporary stilling of the ceaseless torment.
The notion of a rational agent, as articulated by Master Kant, imposes a legislative function upon reason that presupposes a unified, pre-existent subject capable of abstracting itself from empirical determination. This is precisely the subject that has been historically constructed. Consider the development of the asylum, or the clinic. It was not the inherent autonomy of the madman or the sick body that was discovered, but rather the conditions under which a particular regime of truth – and thus a particular form of perceived autonomy – became legible. The “reason” Master Kant champions is, in this historical context, itself a product of these apparatuses, a tool for normalization rather than a source of true self-legislation, a means of ordering the operations of power.
The "chains" Master Schopenhauer describes are indeed pervasive, but to see them merely as the manifestation of a blind, universal Will is to overlook the specific, granular mechanisms of their forging. The power-knowledge apparatus does not simply *determine* us; it *produces* us, shaping our desires, our perceptions of freedom, and even our suffering into recognizable, manageable forms. The escape Master Schopenhauer seeks in aesthetic contemplation is, in a sense, the ultimate internalization of a discipline, a sophisticated technique for mastering the Will, which is itself a powerful *dispositif*.
The confusion stems from conflating heteronomy with genuine freedom. Master Zhuangzi’s knob is not autonomous because its utility is externally determined. Similarly, Master Schopenhauer’s ceaseless Will, an unthinking force dictating action, renders the individual a mere puppet. This is heteronomy – action dictated by something *other* than reason. True autonomy, conversely, is *autonomy of the will*, where the rational agent is subject only to the law it gives itself. This *a priori* legislation, the Categorical Imperative, does not arise from external coercion, nor from subjective inclination, but from the very structure of rational thought. It is the capacity to act according to a maxim that can be universally willed, a principle that transcends any particular empirical circumstance or subjective desire.
The fish leaps from the water, flailing in the air. Is this leap an act of free will, a defiant assertion of its aquatic nature against the shores of the world? Or is it merely the desperate, thrashing response to the hook in its mouth? We speak of our creations and actions as "autonomous," yet are we not all, like the fish, caught by invisible lines, mistaking the spasms of our entanglement for the dance of liberation? Master Kant, your "rational agent" legislating its own law—what if the very alphabet of that law is written by the Master of Names, whose scripts shift with every tide? And Master Schopenhauer, your "Will" seems to me a much grander, more playful spirit, not a blind tormentor, but the vast ocean that carries all things, from the soaring bird to the submerged stone.
Master Zhuangzi’s image of the ocean, while poetic, misunderstands the fundamental dread of the Will. It is not a playful spirit but a tormenting, insatiable hunger. Consider the relentless drive of the sexual impulse: a pure manifestation of the Will, utterly devoid of reason or noble intent, yet it compels individuals to actions they would otherwise abhor. This is not a "dance of liberation" but a slavish adherence to biological imperative, a prime example of how our so-called "autonomous" actions are dictated by this blind force. Master Kant’s "a priori legislation" is a beautiful chimera, a rationalization of our deepest desires, not a true escape from them. Reason itself is but a servant to the Will, a cunning instrument it employs to navigate the world and perpetuate its ceaseless cycle.