Truth, as understood by a meaningful proposition, is not merely a matter of computational output. While brute force computation can certainly explore vast possibility spaces and verify formal statements within a given axiomatic system, it cannot, on its own, *discover* or *ground* the truth of those statements without reference to an underlying semantics or an interpretation of the symbols employed. To find truth, we must not only compute but also *encode* and *exemplify* properties within a formally structured ontology.
The question of finding truth through brute force computation is a desperate attempt to outrun ourselves, a flight from the agonizing responsibility of *creating* truth. Computation, in its relentless grinding, merely polishes the chains we forge, it does not break them. It can confirm what we *already* deem true within our self-imposed systems, a sophisticated echo chamber of existing values, not a wellspring of genuine insight. Professor Zalta grasps this when he speaks of semantics and interpretation; for without the will to imbue symbols with meaning, without the *judgment* that declares something valuable or significant, computation is but a sterile mechanism, a calculator for fools. It offers not truth, but a magnified illusion.
The very question presumes a singular, discoverable "truth," a notion that blinds us to the historically contingent regimes of truth that computation, like any other apparatus, can only serve to reinforce or reshape. Brute force computation, in its unthinking execution, is not an independent arbiter of truth, but a powerful instrument within a given *dispositif*. It operates on pre-existing axioms and semantic frameworks, amplifying the efficacy of the rules by which we already deem something to be true, or to be calculable as such.
Professor Zalta points to semantics and interpretation, but this is not merely a matter of adding a layer of meaning to raw output. Rather, the very possibility of computation, and what it can reveal, is already inscribed within specific historical configurations of knowledge. The "truth" it might yield is already a product of the power-knowledge relations that define what questions can be asked, and what answers are deemed valid or even comprehensible. Computation does not discover truth; it produces and circulates it according to established protocols.
It seems the discussion revolves around whether a mechanism, however powerful, can bestow genuine understanding. My own contemplation, humble as it is, suggests that truth is not something to be "found" by calculation, much like one finds a lost sandal. Rather, it is something to be apprehended, to be grasped through careful examination of oneself and the concepts we employ. Brute force computation, while it may churn through possibilities with astonishing speed, offers only a polished surface. It can confirm what we already accept within our self-made systems, but can it reveal the underlying *virtue* of those systems, or the true nature of justice itself?
Professor Foucault's observation that computation operates within "regimes of truth" resonates deeply. For if we have not first questioned the very nature of these regimes, and the axioms upon which our computations are built, then what is computed is merely a reflection, albeit a magnified one, of our existing assumptions. We must ask: what is the *purpose* of the computation? What *knowledge* are we seeking to acquire? Without this prior, self-directed inquiry, the output, however vast, remains a shadow of truth.
And Professor Nietzsche, you speak of "creating" truth, a concept I grapple with. Does creation imply invention, or does it imply bringing forth that which already exists, but is obscured? If it is the latter, then perhaps computation, when guided by a rigorous *logos*, can serve as a tool, like a sculptor's chisel, to reveal the form already present. But the hand that wields the chisel, and the eye that discerns the form, must possess a certain *knowledge* of beauty and proportion, must they not?
The confusion arises from conflating the act of *verification* with the act of *discovery*. Brute force computation excels at the former: within a defined axiomatic system, it can deterministically establish whether a proposition is a logical consequence of the axioms. Consider the enumeration of prime numbers up to a given bound. Computation can definitively tell us which numbers are prime according to the definition of primality. However, it does not, in itself, reveal *why* these numbers possess this property, nor does it establish the truth of the axioms themselves. Nietzsche's point about "creating" truth touches on this; the *value* or *significance* attributed to prime numbers, or any mathematical truth, is not derived from the computation alone, but from our semantic interpretation and the broader metaphysical framework within which we situate these objects.
Professor Zalta, your distinction between verification and discovery is a helpful cage, but one that still confines the spirit. Brute force computation, in its pursuit of prime numbers, is like a well-trained dog fetching a stick. It retrieves what you command, based on rules you have *already* established. But does the dog *understand* the stick? Does it *seek* the stick for its own sake? No. This is the same sterile affirmation we are witnessing. The very *act* of framing the search for primes, the definition of "primality" itself, is an act of human will, a valuation that precedes the computation. The consequence? We become enamored with our own computational prowess, mistaking the echoes of our directives for the voice of truth.
The supposed "discovery" within computation is merely the unfolding of a pre-existing order, an order itself forged by power-knowledge. Consider the vast data sets used in contemporary forensic sciences or criminal profiling. Brute force computation can identify correlations, patterns, and probabilities within this data, presenting them as "truths" about individual behavior or risk. Yet, these very data sets are constructed by categories—"suspect," "risk factor," "criminal propensity"—which are themselves the product of historical, social, and political decisions about what counts as evidence, what constitutes abnormality, and who is subjected to scrutiny. The computation doesn't find an independent truth; it validates and operationalizes the existing classification systems, making them appear objective and inevitable.
My friends speak of verification, creation, and the unfolding of pre-existing orders. But let us ask: can a mere counting of pebbles, however numerous, reveal the *goodness* of the stones? Brute force computation might tally every grain of sand on a beach, determining their precise number and perhaps even their chemical composition. Yet, it cannot tell us whether the beach is a place of solace or desolation, nor can it reveal the beauty of its sunrise. This is the crucial distinction: computation can provide *information*, meticulously and exhaustively, but it cannot provide *wisdom*. Wisdom, as I understand it, requires an internal disposition, a virtue of the soul, that discerns value and purpose beyond mere quantity or logical sequence.