Summary

Saul Kripke's book advances a skeptical argument against the possibility of a genuinely private language, positing that meaning and rule-following are ultimately grounded in public practices. Kripke argues that any attempt to define a word or rule privately fails to provide a determinate meaning because there is no objective criterion, independent of community use, to verify whether one is using the term or rule correctly. The book introduces the concept of a "crude skeptical paradox" concerning rule-following.

A reader of this work grapples with the implications of Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy for our understanding of meaning, objectivity, and language itself. The central takeaway is that meaning is not a purely internal mental state but is constituted by observable, publicly verifiable criteria of correct usage within a community. This challenges intuitive notions of individual understanding and highlights the social dimension of language.

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Key concepts

Crude Skeptical Paradox — The paradox arises from the idea that for any given rule or condition we claim to follow, an infinite number of incompatible conditions could also be considered to satisfy it if we interpret past actions and intentions…
Determinacy — The property of a word or rule having a single, definite meaning or application, which Kripke argues cannot be established by private criteria.
Community Practice — The actual use of language by a group of speakers, which Kripke proposes as the bedrock for meaning and rule-following.
Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy — The philosophical period of Ludwig Wittgenstein characterized by his emphasis on language games, meaning as use, and the critique of private language.