Synthesized answer
In the translation of Schopenhauer's work, "Vorstellung" has been rendered as "idea" [1]. This choice was made "after careful consideration of their meaning in the theory of knowledge" [1]. The translators state that "representation" was considered but rejected as it is "neither accurate, intelligible, nor elegant" [1].
The term "Idee" (capitalized) is also translated by the same word, "Idea" [1]. The passages indicate that "Vorstellung" can refer to the whole visible world or the sum total of experience, with the conditions of its possibility [3]. These are also referred to as "ideas of perception" [3]. Abstract ideas, or concepts, are also mentioned as a class of ideas [3].
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
y, the equivalents used have only been adopted after careful consideration of their meaning in the theory of knowledge. For example, “Vorstellung” has been rendered by “idea,” in preference to “representation,” which is neither accurate, intelligible, nor elegant. “Idee,” is translated by the same word, but spelled with a capital,—“Idea.” Again, “Anschauung” has been rendered according to the context, either by “perception” simply, or by “intuition or perception.” Notwithstanding statements to the contrary in the text, the book is probably quite intelligible in itself, apart from the…
ct ideas which cannot be presented in perception, but are general, and have no individual existence in space and time. Only in single cases do we pass from the conception to the perception, do we construct images as _representatives of concepts_ in perception, to which, however, they are never adequate. These cases are fully discussed in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 28, and therefore I shall not repeat my explanation here. It may be compared, however, with what is said by Hume in the twelfth of his “Philosophical Essays,” p. 244, and by Herder in the…
is known and present to the reader, for if it had not been already said it would necessarily find its place here. § 3. The chief distinction among our ideas is that between ideas of perception and abstract ideas. The latter form just one class of ideas, namely concepts, and these are the possession of man alone of all creatures upon earth. The capacity for these, which distinguishes him from all the lower animals, has always been called reason.(5) We shall consider these abstract ideas by themselves later, but, in the first place, we shall speak exclusively of the _ideas of…
adopted in consequence of some arbitrary abstraction. And yet it is a conception from which he can never free himself. The defectiveness of this view will be corrected in the next book by means of a truth which is not so immediately certain as that from which we start here; a truth at which we can arrive only by deeper research and more severe abstraction, by the separation of what is different and the union of what is identical. This truth, which must be very serious and impressive if not awful to every one, is that a man can also say and must say, “the world is my will.” In this…
The World As Will And Idea By Arthur Schopenhauer Translated From The German By R. B. Haldane, M.A. And J. Kemp, M.A. Vol. I. Containing Four Books. “Ob nicht Natur zuletzt sich doch ergünde?”—GOETHE Seventh Edition London Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1909 CONTENTS Translators’ Preface. Preface To The First Edition. Preface To…