Synthesized answer
James defines radical empiricism as an attitude that regards its most assured conclusions about matters of fact as hypotheses potentially subject to modification by future experience [1]. He calls it "radical" because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as a hypothesis, unlike other forms of empiricism (positivism, agnosticism, scientific naturalism) that dogmatically affirm monism as a framework that all experience must conform to [1].
For a radical empiricist, the world is considered a pluralism, and the "crudity of experience" is an eternal element [4]. There is no single viewpoint from which the world appears as an absolutely unified fact [3, 4]. This attitude accepts real possibilities, indeterminacy, evil, and a moral life as conceived by common sense, rather than trying to reinterpret them in a monistic form [3]. James states that his essays serve as illustrations of this radical empiricist attitude [3].
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
of _radical empiricism_, in spite of the fact that such brief nicknames are nowhere more misleading than in philosophy. I say 'empiricism,' because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience; and I say 'radical,' because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and, {viii} unlike so much of the half-way empiricism that is current under the name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with…
stom of inviting once or twice a year some maturer scholar to address them, the occasion often being made a public one. I have from time to time accepted such invitations, and afterwards had my discourse printed in one or other of the Reviews. It has seemed to me that these addresses might now be worthy of collection in a volume, as they shed explanatory light upon each other, and taken together express a tolerably definite philosophic attitude in a very untechnical way. Were I obliged to give a short name to the attitude in question, I should call it that of _radical empiricism_, in…
eternal element thereof. There is no possible point of view from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact. Real possibilities, real indeterminations, real beginnings, real ends, real evil, real crises, catastrophes, and escapes, a real God, and a real moral life, just as common-sense conceives these things, may remain in empiricism as conceptions which that philosophy gives up the attempt either to 'overcome' or to reinterpret in monistic form. Many of my professionally trained _confrères_ will smile at the irrationalism of this view, and at the artlessness of my essays…
; and there may be in the whole universe no one point of view extant from which this would not be found to be the case. "Reason," as a gifted writer says, "is {ix} but one item in the mystery; and behind the proudest consciousness that ever reigned, reason and wonder blushed face to face. The inevitable stales, while doubt and hope are sisters. Not unfortunately the universe is wild,--game-flavored as a hawk's wing. Nature is miracle all; the same returns not save to bring the different. The slow round of the engraver's lathe gains but the breadth of a hair, but the difference…
titude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet are they found? I am, therefore, myself a complete empiricist so far as my theory of human knowledge goes. I live, to be sure, by the practical faith that we must go on experiencing and thinking over our experience, for only thus can our opinions grow more true; but to hold any one of them--I absolutely do not care which--as if it never could be reinterpretable or corrigible, I believe to be a tremendously mistaken attitude, and I think that the whole history of philosophy will bear…