Summary
Thomas Schelling's "The Strategy of Conflict" analyzes international disagreements and conflict resolution through the lens of game theory, particularly focusing on non-zero-sum games. The book examines the international politics of threat and deterrence, presenting specific models and ideas to understand how actors behave and achieve objectives in situations of conflict.
By framing conflict as a strategic interaction, Schelling reveals how perceived interests and the potential for mutual destruction shape decisions. Readers gain insight into the logic of deterrence, understanding how threats and commitments can be used as tools of power in international relations, even when outcomes are not strictly win-lose.
Key concepts
- Deterrence — The use of threat or commitment to prevent an adversary from taking a certain action.
- Game theory — A mathematical framework for analyzing strategic interactions between rational decision-makers.
- Non-zero-sum games — Situations where the gains of one participant do not necessarily correspond to losses for another, allowing for potential mutual benefit or loss.
From the book
Description: Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.
Snippet: Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.