Synthesized answer
This treatise excludes purely physiological performances as they are not indubitable expressions of mind, which are defined as actions done for an end that show a choice of means [2]. Additionally, the anatomy of the nervous system and organs of sense are not described anew, as this information is considered preliminary and taken for granted, with readers directed to standard anatomical and physiological texts [2].
Furthermore, metaphysical discussions are excluded from this work. Specifically, theories of a spiritual agent and of associated "ideas" as presented in psychology books are considered metaphysics [3]. The book takes thoughts and feelings, a physical world, and the knowledge of that world as its data, and the discussion of these data, which is called metaphysics, falls outside the province of this book [4].
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
e sanguine who, in this crowded age, can hope to have many readers for fourteen hundred continuous pages from his pen. But _wer Vieles bringt wird Manchem etwas bringen_; and, by judiciously skipping according to their several needs, I am sure that many sorts of readers, even those who are just beginning the study of the subject, will find my book of use. Since the beginners are most in need of guidance, I suggest for their behoof that they omit altogether on a first reading chapters 6, 7, 8, 10 (from page 330 to page 371), 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 21, and 28. The better to awaken the…
o actions but such as are done for an end, and show a choice of means, can be called indubitable expressions of Mind_. I shall then adopt this as the criterion by which to circumscribe the subject-matter of this work so far as action enters into it. Many nervous performances will therefore be unmentioned, as being purely physiological. Nor will the anatomy of the nervous system and organs of sense be described anew. The reader will find in H. N. Martin's 'Human Body,' in G. T. Ladd's 'Physiological Psychology,' and in all the other standard Anatomies and Physiologies, a mass of…
ake, and unconscious that she is metaphysical, spoils two good things when she injects herself into a natural science. And it seems to me that the theories both of a spiritual agent and of associated 'ideas' are, as they figure in the psychology-books, just such metaphysics as this. Even if their results be true, it would be as well to keep them, _as thus presented_, out of psychology as it is to keep the results of idealism out of physics. I have therefore treated our passing thoughts as integers, and regarded the mere laws of their coexistence with brain-states as the ultimate laws…
seful substitute for the entire chapter. I have kept close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book. Every natural science assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements between which its own 'laws' obtain, and from which its own deductions are carried on. Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) _thoughts and feelings_, and (2) _a physical world_ in time and space with which they coexist and which (3) _they know_. Of course these data themselves are discussable; but the discussion of them (as of other…
machine-like yet purposive acts as these be included in Psychology? The boundary-line of the mental is certainly vague. It is better not to be pedantic, but to let the science be as vague as its subject, and include such phenomena as these if by so doing we can throw any light on the main business in hand. It will ere long be seen, I trust, that we can; and that we gain much more by a broad than by a narrow conception of our subject. At a certain stage in the development of every science a degree of vagueness is what best consists with fertility.