Synthesized answer
James defines the "cash-value" of a true idea as what is realized in experiential terms [1]. The truth of an idea is not a static property but happens to it; it becomes true through events and processes of its own verification [1]. Essentially, true ideas are those that can be assimilated, validated, corroborated, and verified, while false ideas are those that cannot [1].
The "cash-value" is the practical difference that having true ideas makes to us [1]. It consists of the "workings" or consequences, mental or physical, that an idea is able to set up. These workings bring the possessor into closer touch with reality and consist of particulars that admit of concrete description [3]. The truth of an idea is constituted by these concrete workings that intervene between the idea and some particular reality [3]. This means an idea is true if it helps us deal with reality or its belongings, adapts our life to the reality's setting, and does not entangle our progress in frustrations [4]. While the phrase "cash-value" was intended to mean more than just pecuniary profit and loss, it was interpreted by some as solely referring to monetary gain [2].
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
experiences [may] be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? How will the truth be realized? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?" The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: TRUE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CAN ASSIMILATE, VALIDATE, CORROBORATE, AND VERIFY. FALSE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CANNOT. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that therefore is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known as. 'The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth HAPPENS…
among all the other good workings by which true beliefs are characterized, this kind of subsequential utility remains. The second misleading circumstance was the emphasis laid by Schiller and Dewey on the fact that, unless a truth be relevant to the mind's momentary predicament, unless it be germane to the 'practical' situation,--meaning by this the quite particular perplexity,--it is no good to urge it. It doesn't meet our interests any better than a falsehood would under the same circumstances. But why our predicaments and perplexities might not be theoretical here as well as…
by a vision quite as particular and direct as was the taste of the beer. If he does so, he calls THAT idea, also, true. His idea has, in each case, brought him into closer touch with a reality felt at the moment to verify just that idea. Each reality verifies and validates its own idea exclusively; and in each case the verification consists in the satisfactorily-ending consequences, mental or physical, which the idea was able to set up. These 'workings' differ in every single instance, they never transcend experience, they consist of particulars, mental or sensible, and they admit of…
rification. For one truth-process completed, there are a million in our lives that function in [the] state of nascency. They lead us towards direct verification; lead us into the surroundings of the object they envisage; and then, if everything, runs on harmoniously, we are so sure that verification is possible that we omit it, and are usually justified by all that happens.'] 'To agree in the widest sense with a reality can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something…
orld with circumstances of a sort to make a satisfactory verification process, lying around and between the two terms. But just as a man may be called an heir and treated as one before the executor has divided the estate, so an idea may practically be credited with truth before the verification process has been exhaustively carried out--the existence of the mass of verifying circumstance is enough. Where potentiality counts for actuality in so many other cases, one does not see why it may not so count here. We call a man benevolent not only for his kind acts paid in, but for his…