Book

Sense and Sensibilia

by John L. Austin

Chat with this book

Summary

John L. Austin's "Sense and Sensibilia" argues that the prevalent philosophical theory of sense-data, which posits an intermediary realm of raw, uninterpreted sensory experiences between the perceiver and the external world, is fundamentally flawed. Austin contends that what we perceive are not sense-data, but the actual things in the world, and that the theory arises from mistaking and misusing ordinary language, particularly the verb "to see" and terms like "hallucination" and "illusion." The book meticulously dissects the concept of sense-data, demonstrating how it leads to insoluble paradoxes and an unnecessarily complicated account of perception.

By examining a wide range of perceptual scenarios, from ordinary seeing to cases of hallucination and illusion, Austin seeks to show that the notion of sense-data is a philosophical fabrication that fails to correspond to how we actually experience and talk about perception. Readers are left with a clearer understanding of how philosophical theories can be distorted by a misunderstanding of everyday language and a more robust account of perception grounded in our common-sense use of words.

Full text isn't indexed yet — this overview draws on general knowledge of the book and its metadata, and chat works the same way.

Key concepts

  • Sense-data — A hypothetical, uninterpreted raw sensation that is posited as the immediate object of perception, lying between the perceiver and the external world.
  • Hallucination — Austin re-evaluates the concept of hallucination, arguing it is not seeing a sense-datum but rather a misperception of an actual object.
  • Illusion — Similar to hallucination, Austin views illusions not as perceiving false sense-data, but as a faulty perception of real objects.
  • Ordinary Language Philosophy — A philosophical approach, championed by Austin, that emphasizes the analysis of everyday language to resolve philosophical problems.
  • "How do you know?" — Austin analyzes this question not as a request for justification of a sense-datum, but as a challenge to the grounds for one's claim to know something about the world.