Synthesized answer
Loving-kindness plays a significant role in Schopenhauer's ethics as one of the two cardinal virtues, alongside justice. Both of these virtues, according to Schopenhauer, have their root in natural Compassion [3]. Loving-kindness is described as a manifestation of Compassion in a higher degree, and it is more easily discerned as the root of loving-kindness than of justice [1, 2]. Schopenhauer posits that loving-kindness, along with justice, are virtues that are occasionally performed without any expectation of reward or fear of punishment [4].
Loving-kindness is considered a "duty of virtue" or an "imperfect duty," which Schopenhauer distinguishes from "duties of law" or perfect duties. He sees loving-kindness as a positive virtue, representing the act of helping, in contrast to justice which represents doing no harm [3]. In a simplified classification of Egoism and Compassion, loving-kindness is associated with the higher power of Compassion [6].
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
loving-kindness, which are explained as the manifestation of Compassion in a lower, and a higher, degree, respectively. In the course of the demonstration the question as to how far a lie is legitimate comes incidentally under discussion; as also the theory of Duty; duties being defined as "actions, the simple omission of which constitutes a wrong." (Cf. Part II., Chapter III.) The position now reached, namely, that Compassion is the one and only fount of true morality, because it is the sole non-egoistic source of action, is (says Schopenhauer) a strange paradox; hence the…
iving things is the surest and most certain token of a really good man. (5) The evidence of separate matters of detail. (6) Compassion is more easily discerned in its higher power; it is more obviously the root of loving-kindness than of justice. (7) Compassion does not stop short with men; it includes all living beings. (8) Considered simply from the empirical point of view, Compassion is the best possible antidote to Egoism, no less than the most soothing balsam for the world's inevitable suffering. (9) Rousseau's testimony is quoted, as well as passages from the Paṅća-tantra,…
t is the natural, unmistakable, and sharp separation between negative and positive, between doing no harm, and helping. The terms in common use--namely, "the duties of law," and "the duties of virtue," (the latter being also called "duties of love," or "imperfect duties,") are in the first place faulty because they co-ordinate the _genus_ with the _species_; for justice is one of the virtues. And next, they owe their origin to the mistake of giving a much too wide extension to the idea "Duty"; which I shall reduce to its proper limits below. In place, therefore, of these duties I put…
ute Ought" grown into a fathomless inscrutable _Εἱμαρμένη_, etc. With Part III. we reach the positive part of the work. Schopenhauer begins (Chapter I.) by emphasising the necessity of finding a basis for Ethics that appeals, not to the intellect, but to the intuitive perception. Such (he says) can never be any artificial formula, which surely crumbles to powder beneath the rough touch of real life; rather must it be something springing out of the heart of things, and therefore lying at the root of man's nature. But is there, he asks (Chapter II.), after all, such a thing as natural…
pulverised together under our sage's withering wrath and trenchant irony, should read his Introduction to each Edition. [4] Incidentally (Chapter III.), duties towards ourselves, properly so called, are shown to be non-existent from the Schopenhauerian standpoint. Cf. the definition of Duty in Part III., Chapter VI. [5] Schopenhauer treated this subject exhaustively in his Essay on "The Freedom of the Will," which, written immediately before, and more fortunate than, the present treatise, was awarded the prize by the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences in January, 1839. [6] If, as above…