Henry E. Allison's "Kant's Theory of Freedom" argues that Kant's concept of freedom is not about uncaused action but about the capacity for autonomy, defined as self-legislation. Allison posits that for Kant, freedom is the necessary presupposition of morality, meaning we must assume ourselves to be free in order to act morally. This freedom is grounded in our rational nature, which allows us to transcend empirical inclinations and act according to self-imposed rational laws.
The book unpacks Kant's distinction between the intelligible and phenomenal realms to explain how freedom is possible. It demonstrates that our actions in the phenomenal world can still be free if they originate from the intelligible character, which is governed by reason. Readers gain a precise understanding of Kant's complex arguments regarding transcendental freedom, practical reason, and the source of moral obligation, illustrating how freedom is central to both our theoretical and practical lives as rational agents.
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Key concepts
- Transcendental Freedom — The property of reason as the cause of its own determinations, independent of empirical causality.
- Autonomy — The capacity of the will to be a law to itself, acting according to rational principles rather than external determination.
- Intelligible Character — The character of a rational being as it exists independently of the sensory world, the source of free actions.
- Phenomenal Realm — The world of experience, governed by natural laws and causality.
- Practical Reason — The faculty of reason concerned with determining what ought to be done, the basis of moral action.