Summary

G.E.M. Anscombe's "Intention" argues that the ordinary language concept of intention is philosophically fundamental and irreducible to other mental states like desire or belief. Anscombe claims that intending an action is not a matter of having a specific feeling or mental event that causes the action, but rather an interpretation of an action as one's own, often rooted in reasons for acting that are already present in the agent's practical reasoning. She seeks to clarify the structure of intentional action, distinguishing it from accidental or involuntary movements.

The book offers an analysis of practical reasoning, wherein intentions are formed and guide behavior. Anscombe introduces the concept of "the intentional causation of action" to explain how intentions relate to our movements and how we understand ourselves as agents. A reader gains a deeper understanding of how we ascribe intentions to ourselves and others, moving beyond a simplistic causal model of mental events leading to actions and recognizing intention as integral to our self-conception as rational agents.

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Key concepts

Reasons for Acting — The underlying justifications and motivations that explain why an agent performs a particular action intentionally.
Intentional Causation — The specific way in which an intention brings about an action, understood not as a brute causal link but as part of practical reasoning.
Description of Action — How an action is described in terms of its intention, revealing the agent's understanding of their own behavior.
The Future-Oriented Nature of Intention — How intentions are directed towards future actions and how this orientation shapes our understanding of the present.
Practical Knowledge — Knowledge about one's own actions that is inherently connected to the intention behind them.