Intention

G.E.M. Anscombe's "Intention" argues that intentional action is characterized by the agent's possession of reasons for acting, and that these reasons, particularly the "knowledge of what one is doing," are distinct from mere sensations or bodily movements. The central thesis is that intention is primarily understood through the concept of "doing something for a reason," rather than through a specific mental state that precedes action. This analysis reorients the philosophy of action by foregrounding practical reasoning and the agent's own account of their actions, challenging existing theories that treated intention as a psychological event or a simple causal link.

The book introduces the concept of "intention in action" as distinct from "foreknowledge in intention," emphasizing that the specification of an action's intentionality depends on the agent's understanding and description of it. Anscombe distinguishes between actions that are described intentionally and those that are not, asserting that the former are actions done for reasons. Readers gain a deeper understanding of how to analyze human behavior, moving beyond simple stimulus-response models to recognize the role of the agent's practical knowledge and reasoning in constituting intentionality.

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Key concepts

• Knowledge of what one is doing — The agent's understanding of the specific action they are performing, which is constitutive of its intentionality.
• Reasons for acting — The explanations or justifications that an agent can provide for their behavior, forming the basis of intentionality.
• Ascending series of intentions — A structure where an action is understood as a means to a further end, and that end as a means to another, forming a chain of reasons.
• Intention in action — The intentionality that is present and evident in the immediate execution of a bodily movement.
• Foreknowledge in intention — The knowledge of future states of affairs that an agent intends to bring about, distinct from the intentionality of the present action.