Summary

Henry E. Allison's "Custom and Reason in Hume" argues that David Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, can be read as implicitly advocating a Kantian conception of reason, not as a purely descriptive account of psychological habits. Allison contends that Hume’s account of the origin of our beliefs in causality, personal identity, and the external world, while appearing to rely solely on custom and association, actually presupposes a form of synthetic a priori judgment that mirrors Kant’s transcendental critique. This interpretation aims to reconcile Hume’s empiricism with a robust, albeit unintended, rationalist epistemology.

The book's central thesis is that Hume’s concept of custom, far from being merely a psychological propensity, functions as a necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge, thereby aligning with Kantian insights into the synthetic nature of certain fundamental beliefs. Readers will understand how Hume's skepticism about reason can be reinterpreted as a critique of dogmatic metaphysics, and how his emphasis on custom actually highlights the constructive, rather than merely passive, role of the mind in shaping our understanding of reality.

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Key concepts

Synthetic a priori judgment — A judgment that is universal and necessary, yet also informative about the world, characteristic of Kantian epistemology.
Transcendental critique — An examination of the conditions of possibility for experience and knowledge, as undertaken by Kant.
Custom as a necessary condition — The idea that Hume's concept of custom is not simply an observed habit, but a presupposition for any belief formation.
Humean skepticism as critique of dogmatism — The interpretation of Hume's skeptical arguments not as undermining all knowledge, but as challenging unfounded metaphysical claims.