Synthesized answer
Metzinger argues for the elimination of the canonical concept of qualia because it was found to be incoherent [5]. He proposes "phenomenal presentation" or "phenomenal presentational content" as successor concepts for what were previously called "qualia" [1]. This radical stance is a necessary consequence of his self-model theory because the theory suggests that our phenomenal world is a global simulation generated from scratch, which would cause the perceived reality to lose its character as an untranscendable reality [3]. Instead, it would be experienced as a possibility [3].
The self-model theory also views phenomenal experience as arising from "phenomenal mental models" [2, 4]. These models are described as globally available for cognition, attention, and the immediate control of behavior [4]. They are integrated complexes of simpler content and are supramodal, generated by integrating different sensory information sources [4]. The elimination of the classic concept of qualia, described as the most simple forms of phenomenal content, is seen as a result of this theoretical framework, which instead accounts for phenomena like categorizable perceptual content and subjective…
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From the book
Let me offer such a third working concept: “Phenomenal presentation” or “phenome¬ nal presentational content” could become successor concepts for what we, in the past, used to call “qualia” or “first-order phenomenal properties” (box 2.7). As we have seen above, there are “Lewis qualia,” “Raffman qualia,” and “Metzinger qualia” (with these three not exhausting logical space, but only identifying the phenomenologically most interesting terms). Lewis qualia present stimulus-correlated information in a way that fulfills all three subconstraints of global availability, namely, availability…
or genuinely conscious, phenomenal processes of representation as opposed to merely mental processes of representation. In chapter 3, I attempt to give a closer description of the concrete vehicles of representation underlying the flow of subjective experience, by introducing the working concept of a “phenomenal mental model.” This is in preparation for the steps taken in the second half of the book (chapters 5 through 7), trying to answer questions like these: What exactly is “perspec- tivalness,” the dominant structural feature of our phenomenal space? How do some…
uence of this would be that the multimodal, high-dimensional surface of our phenom¬ enal world would start to dissolve. We would then phenomenally experience the model as an ongoing global simulation permanently generated from scratch, as it were, and thereby it would inevitably lose the phenomenal character of being an untranscendable reality. We would experience it as a possibility, as only one of countless hypotheses active and inces¬ santly competing in the system. Obviously, this would lead to a dramatic shift in a whole range of computational and functional system properties. The…
developments. Phenomenal mental models will be those mental models which are, func¬ tionally speaking, globally available for cognition, attention, and the immediate control of behavior. Any individual phenomenal model is in principle available for mental catego¬ rization and concept formation, because phenomenal modeling begins on the object level. Phenomenal mental models always are integrated complexes of more simple kinds of content (they are what I termed a phenomenal “holon” in Metzinger 1995c). Typically, phenomenal mental models are supramodal structures generated by an…
Now one clearly sees how our classic concept of qualia as the most simple forms of phe¬ nomenal content was incoherent and can be eliminated. Of course, this does not mean that — ontologically speaking — this simple phenomenal content, forming the epistemic goal of our investigation, does not exist. On the contrary, this type of simple, ineffable content does exist and there exist higher-order, functionally more rich forms of simple phenomenal content — for instance, categorizable perceptual content (Lewis qualia) or the experience of subjective “sameness” when instantly recognizing the…
More questions about this book
- The title "Being No One" seems to contradict the concept of a "Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity." Explain this apparent paradox as if to someone unfamiliar with the topic, outlining the central problem Metzinger likely addresses and how his theory might reconcile these two ideas.
- If subjectivity arises from a "self-model," how might this theory explain the experience of a "first-person perspective" and the existence of a "phenomenal self" (Ch 1.1) without positing an independent, non-modelled 'I' or observer?
- Chapter 2 details transitions "From mental to phenomenal representation, simulation, and presentation." Choose one of these transitions (e.g., from mental to phenomenal representation) and explain, using specific sub-sections from Chapter 2 as examples, what key features or properties transform a purely "mental" state into a "phenomenal" or conscious experience according to the outlined structure.
- Chapter 3 lists "Multilevel constraints" like "perspectivalness" and "transparency" as part of the "Representational Deep Structure of Phenomenal Experience." Select one of these constraints and elaborate on how its presence might be *necessary* for the formation and operation of a coherent "self-model" that gives rise to subjectivity.