Synthesized answer
Hume defines knowledge as the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas [1]. He distinguishes this from other forms of reasoning, noting that causational arguments can exceed mere probability and be considered a superior kind of evidence [1].
Probability, in relation to cause and effect, is described as evidence attended with uncertainty [1]. It is founded on the presumption of a resemblance between objects experienced in the past and those not yet experienced [2]. The idea of cause and effect itself is derived from experience, which reveals constant conjunctions between particular objects [4]. However, Hume also notes that in common discourse, many arguments from causation are not treated as merely probable but as a superior kind of evidence [1, 5]. The passages do not provide a comprehensive definition of how Hume specifically defines probability *in relation to cause and effect*, beyond it being evidence attended with uncertainty and founded on resemblance from past experience. It also doesn't fully elaborate on how arguments from cause and effect are categorized under probability or how they differ in certainty.
Synthesized from the book passages below. Chat with the book on Feynman for follow-up.
From the book
dily affirm, that many arguments from causation exceed probability, and may be received as a superior kind of evidence. One would appear ridiculous, who would say, that it is only probable the sun will rise to-morrow, or that all men must dye; though it is plain we have no further assurance of these facts, than what experience affords us. For this reason, it would perhaps be more convenient, in order at once to preserve the common signification of words, and mark the several degrees of evidence, to distinguish human reason into three kinds, viz. THAT FROM KNOWLEDGE, FROM PROOFS, AND…
to be immediately present in its impression, we thence presume on the existence of one similar to its usual attendant. According to this account of things, which is, I think, in every point unquestionable, probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those, of which we have had none; and therefore it is impossible this presumption can arise from probability. The same principle cannot be both the cause and effect of another; and this is, perhaps, the only proposition concerning that relation, which is either…
do not suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connections and durations. But of this more fully hereafter.[8] [8] Part IV, Sect. 2. PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. SECT. I. OF KNOWLEDGE. There are seven[1] different kinds of philosophical relation, viz. RESEMBLANCE, IDENTITY, RELATIONS OF TIME AND PLACE, PROPORTION IN QUANTITY OR NUMBER, DEGREES IN ANY QUALITY, CONTRARIETY and CAUSATION. These relations may be divided into two classes; into such as depend entirely on the ideas, which we compare together, and such as may…
re of ideas, the action of the mind, in observing the relation, would, properly speaking, be sensation, not reasoning. It is therefore necessary, that in all probable reasonings there be something present to the mind, either seen or remembered; and that from this we infer something connected with it, which is not seen nor remembered. The only connexion or relation of objects, which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses, is that of cause and effect; and that because it is the only one, on which we can found a just inference from one object to another.…
s, which have their effect upon the poet himself, as well as upon his readers. SECT. XI. OF THE PROBABILITY OF CHANCES. But in order to bestow on this system its full force and evidence, we must carry our eye from it a moment to consider its consequences, and explain from the same principles some other species of reasoning, which are derived from the same origin. Those philosophers, who have divided human reason into knowledge and probability, and have defined the first to be that evidence, which arises from the comparison of ideas, are obliged to comprehend all our arguments from…