Summary
Chiang Kai-shek's "Soviet Russia in China" argues that Soviet Russia harbors aggressive designs on China, aiming to convert it into a satellite state through espionage, political subversion, and the manipulation of Chinese political parties and armies. The book presents documents illustrating how Moscow, through its ambassador and agents like Borodin, organized intelligence departments for wholesale espionage, exploited political factions, and disseminated communist doctrines to undermine Chinese sovereignty. These clandestine actions, disguised as aid, were intended to clandestinely undermine law and order, misleading the Kuomintang Party and its supporters. The author implores the Chinese people to awaken to these ulterior motives and recognize Soviet Russia's self-seeking nature.
The book details a comprehensive Soviet strategy for China, directed by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and executed through its Intelligence Department and the Comintern. This strategy involves extensive intelligence work, study of China's conditions, and the supply of funds and military assistance to specific Chinese groups, such as Feng Yu-hsiang. The aim is to exploit internal conflicts and national movements to further Soviet geopolitical objectives, including countering perceived aggression from other foreign powers. Chiang Kai-shek seeks to expose this "elaborate system of…
Key concepts
- Aggressive designs of Moscow — The stated intention of the Soviet Government to encroach upon China's territory and control its political and military affairs.
- Wholesale espionage — The systematic and comprehensive gathering of intelligence on Chinese politicians, military commanders, and political parties by Soviet agents.
- Exploiting political parties and armies — The Soviet tactic of manipulating Chinese factions for their own strategic benefit, often under the guise of support.
- Agitation and seduction — The use of propaganda, invention of party slogans, and placement of advisers by Moscow to influence and control Chinese entities.
- Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R. — The authoritative Soviet organ responsible for directing military work and intelligence operations in China.
- Elaborate System of Espionage and Intelligence Service — The structured and detailed network of intelligence gathering and covert operations orchestrated by Soviet Russia within China.
From the book
Title: Soviet Russia in China (1957) by Chiang Kai-shek← Soviet Plot in China ( 1927 ) by The Metropontan Police Headquarters → 5003086 Soviet Plot in China 1927 The Metropontan Police Headquarters Soviet Plot in China Published by The Metropolitan Police Headquarters PEKING; CHINA 1928 PREFACE FOREWORD POSTSCRIPT Chapter I. Moscow's Cloven Hoof. 1. Instructions to the Soviet Military Attaché regarding Policy to be followed in China. 2. Resolution on the Chinese Question adopted by the Executive Committee of the International Communist Party. 3. Minutes of a Meeting of the Soviet Commission for Chinese Affairs held on August 4, 1926. Chapter II. Active Participation in Kuomintang Affairs. 1. The Military Section (Voyenka) of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 2.…
Popular questions readers ask
- Given the title "Soviet Plot in China," how does the specific nature of the documents listed (e.g., instructions, financial reports, meeting minutes) either challenge or reinforce the idea of a "plot" rather than, say, a transparent alliance, and what does this imply about the *purpose* of this publication?
- The text outlines Soviet engagement with both the Kuomintang (Canton) and Feng Yu-hsiang. How might the provision of different types of aid (military, financial, advisory) to these distinct entities reflect a complex, potentially even contradictory, Soviet strategic approach to China in the 1920s?
- If you were explaining Chapter VI ("Supply of Arms to Feng Yu-hsiang") to someone unfamiliar with the context, what underlying *motivations* might the Soviets have had for such extensive support, and how might these motivations connect to their broader ideological or geopolitical goals?
- Beyond simply listing the types of assistance, what does the granularity of the documentation (e.g., specific dates, rubles, personnel plans) suggest about the *level of Soviet integration and influence* within Chinese military and political structures during this period?
- Consider the relationship between Chapter IV ("Soviet 'Advisers'") and Chapter III ("How the Soviet Military Attaché Pulls the Wires"). What does the juxtaposition of these chapters suggest about the *true nature of Soviet authority and autonomy* versus Chinese agency within these collaborations?